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2Summary
This study provides an economic history of the Internet access market in New Zealand from 1996,
essentially the inception of the market, to early 1999. It reviews the strategy literature about entry to
new markets and tests a resource-based theory concerning the timing of entry.
The economic history describes and analyses the Internet access market in great detail. One
advantage of the small size of New Zealand is that it is possible in studies of this sort to examine in
detail the economic and strategic behaviours of almost all firms in the market. The market is one of
low barriers to entry and, often, low switching costs for customers. The entry and exit that have
occurred throughout the three years of the study, and the consequent rapid, steep price declines and
quantity expansions that resulted are described.
The test of entry strategy focusses on the different, complementary resources that each Internet
Service Provider (ISP) has had. Mitchell’s dual-clock theory is proposed as an explanation as to
why Xtra and ClearNet were late entrants among moderately competitive ISPs and yet quickly
acquired substantial market shares. Mitchell’s dual-clock theory states that a firm from a main
industry may enter a subfield later and still become dominant if its resources, acquired in the main
industry, are useable in the new subfield.  Mitchell’s theory focuses on an emergent new product or
service that can be identified as a separate field from the main industry, yet have a definite
relationship with the original industry, hence a subfield.  He discusses the strategy of industry leaders,
3entering a market later and using complementary resources to gain market share over market
pioneers.
Examination of the theory focuses particularly upon the entry of the ISP Xtra to the New Zealand
market, but not to the exclusion of the other entrants. Xtra is the Internet access service provided by
Telecom New Zealand Limited, and its parent is the largest telecommunication service provider in
New Zealand.  Xtra’s resources, acquired from its parent company, have enabled it to capture the
largest market share and a sustained competitive advantage.  In particular, the quantity of financial
resources made available to Xtra has enabled the firm’s services to be priced competitively and
promoted heavily. There may also have been some advantage in communication with the parent
company about the use and configuration of network resources that facilitated the outcome, although
these resources were available to all competitors at equivalent prices.
Established telecommunications firms are likely to have sought a presence in the ISP market as an
option on the evolution of modes of delivery of telephony and related services in the future as
technology unfolds. Direct customer contact by an IP may be as important for  future
telecommunications company profitability as traditional telephony.  Xtra’s broad-based approach to
acquiring customers and ClearNet’s focus on existing telephony customers are in accord with this
motivation.
Finally, in the New Zealand ISP market it has been possible for a pioneer starting with very limited
financial resources to compete successfully and continue to perform well.  By its innovative
acquisition of bandwidth and pricing strategies Ihug has demonstrated that it can control costs and
expand usage to the point that it is a feature of the New Zealand market and ranks third in market
share.
The economic history of the New Zealand IP market reveals rapid growth in customer uptake,
steeply falling prices and prices that have converged across suppliers. These results are not
4surprising given the low barriers to entry and the increasing range of value-added products that are
obtainable on the internet. Any economic evaluation of this should also take into account the classic
network externality, in which the presence of additional persons with Internet access implies benefits
to other consumers who may want to exchange information with them. In fact, although this
externality is likely to exist, it may not be a s strong as it was in the history of telephony because of
the reasonably close-substitute ways in which consumers can exchange information without Internet
access.  Importantly, any economic evaluation should also take account of the drivers of lower
prices and internet penetration in the population. In this respect the motivations and actions of the
telecommunications companies may have a very important influence the economic performance of
the market. For example, it is argued in this study that Xtra has had a strategy of very aggressive
pricing and broad based promotion funded by its parent. If this aggressive stance induced
penetration in the population to expand more quickly than it otherwise would, and Xtra goes on to at
least cover all costs, including those of its market investment, then these actions will almost certainly
have improved the dynamic efficiency of the economy. The same would be true of any provider that
influenced the size, as opposed to the share, of the Internet access market.  It is likely that this is the
case for market pioneers.
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71.0 Introduction
This study examines the development of the Internet industry in New Zealand over the period 1996-
99, and focuses on the provision of Internet access to business and residential customers.  It
describes the development of the industry through the growth of Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
the organisations that supply Internet access. During the period under study, the market evolved
from one based on small providers to one based on large, focussed businesses.  Although part of the
shift was due to increased demand for Internet access, the entry of Xtra1 into this market was the
defining event.  Xtra is a separate entity that is wholly owned by Telecom New Zealand Limited.  Its
method of operation (price scheme, billing methods, presentation, etc.) signalled to other market
participants that it was prepared to function in a more competitive way. Furthermore, its parent,
Telecom New Zealand, had extensive resources available to support the new venture, which
signalled to the other participants that their competitive strategies must change or they would lose
customers. Xtra was able to enter the market later than many of its competitors, yet quickly capture
the largest market share.  Through its investment of resources in Xtra, Telecom New Zealand made
a strategic decision to develop and maintain a large presence in the Internet Service Provider (ISP)
market.
Internet access services are very similar to the more traditional telephone and data communication
services provided by telecommunication service providers.  Most major telecommunication service
providers have long histories as local monopolies, and have accumulated resources over long
periods of time.  This accumulation of resources is common among other utilities such as those in
electricity and transportation, and include financial, infrastructure, capital and organisational
resources.  Several studies have discussed the disadvantages faced by traditional monopolies when
they subsequently face nimble competitors.  These one-time monopolies are often unable to
reorganise their significant  financial and physical resources, and their management structure is top-
heavy and thus unable to mount counter attacks to the entry of new players in their market.  This
study looks at a different case – one involving an incumbent entering into a new subfield2 within its
main industry, when, in addition, the ex-monopoly continues to be competitive in their original
                                                                
1 A business unit of Telecom, New Zealand.
8market.  The study of Xtra’s entry illustrates how firms with significant resources, complementary to
the market of entry, can successfully enter later.  However, from the viewpoint of others in the
industry, this study also suggests the possibility of competing against an incumbent by using a niche
strategy of securing low cost key resources and maintaining the loyalty of core customers.
More generally, the business strategy literature recognises that managers are in the position to
determine strategies such as adopting late entry into a new market or becoming an early entrant and
subsequently facing later entrants.  In determining the appropriate strategy, the manager must decide
how the timing of market entry affects the firm’s current position and its ability to compete in the
future.  Related to the timing of market entry is the comparative level of resourcing available to each
of the competing parties when a new entrant takes action.  This study examines the relationship
between timing and firm resources through the example of Telecom Xtra’s entrance into the New
Zealand market during the 1996-1999 period.
Notwithstanding the focus of this study on the complementary resource factor, the existing
telecommunications companies would have been motivated by other concerns.  In particular, the
Internet was new and had the potential to utilise the time of their customers.  Managers of these
companies may have assessed that it was in their firm’s interest to go beyond the provision of
network services to maintain direct final customer contact.  Maintaining direct customer contact
provides advantages that may accrue through various potential future demands for
telecommunications related services, and which may protect existing services, such as long distance
toll calls, that are seemingly at risk from the Internet.  The strategy of existing telecommunications
companies may have been to achieve maintenance of their customer base by garnering market share
in the Internet market.  The Clear and Telecom strategies of focussing on their telecommunication
clients are in accord with having been motivated by this factor.
Though generalisations are not necessarily possible for a study of one industry in one country, there
may be interesting wider implications to the example discussed in this paper.  First, many incumbent
telecommunications service providers are entering or have entered the business of providing Internet
access in the US, Australia and Europe.  Also, this example of the ‘incumbent as later entrant’
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2 A subfield is defined in Section 3.
9versus ‘new player as market pioneer’ is being played out simultaneously in many regions.  In
addition, this example has lessons for other emerging subfields in the telecommunications industry.
The paper begins, in Section 2, by defining some relevant telecommunications terms and giving a
brief discussion of the telecommunications market in New Zealand. Section 3 reviews some of the
market entry literature found in business strategy journals.  The review focuses on the relationship
between the resources available to the firm and its strategic advantages. Next, Section 4 outlines the
development of the Internet market in New Zealand over the period 1996-1999, focussing on the
evolution of ISPs through the different stages of development of the industry. These stages are
delineated through the actions of a particular ISP, Xtra. The relative changes in market share for
each of the major ISPs are discussed together with the way changes in price have affected different
types of users. Section 5 then considers this history in relation to the strategic literature – the
resources possessed by particular ISPs, and how these resources have influenced market entry
strategy and market share. Section 6 concludes.
2.0 Definitions and Telecommunications
A list of telecommunications terms used in this study is given in Table 1. In this section, I discuss
some of these terms in more detail, as well as noting some of the characteristics of the industry
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Table 1: Telecommunications Industry Terms
Bandwidth The number of bits flowing through the telecommunications line per second.  This term
is usually measured in Kbps (thousands of bits per second) or Mbps (millions of bits
per second).  The average bandwidth of a customer is defined from their business
location to the ISP’s point-of presence.  Most customers size their bandwidth
requirement not on average use, but on peak requirements.  Choosing the bandwidth
size may effect transmission quality but mostly affects the speed at which the user can
transmit and receive data.
Data
communication
network
Network which only transfers data traffic, i.e. traffic from computers and other sources.
Voice traffic is normally transferred separately from this network unless it is digitised.
Dial up Access Customers call a local or long distance toll number which connects directly with a
modem or switch.  The modem or switch is attached to the ISP’s server which connects
the user with an international gateway either directly or via a data communication
network.
Domain Name Unique Internet Protocol identifier such as vuw.ac.nz
Fibre Optic
Cables
Plastic cables that allow telecommunications traffic to travel at much higher speeds
than other cable types.
Hybrid Fibre
Coax
This is a hybrid network of optical fibre cables of the transport network and coaxial
cables laid to the home.  This hybridisation offers a cost-effective manner of providing
very high bandwidth in the transport network and hundreds of Mbps to the home, as
coaxial cable is cheaper to purchase and install.
IPNet Internet Protocol Network: Telecom’s proprietary network that removes Internet traffic
from the PSTN network at each switching exchange and sends it to its destination
(usually an Internet Service Provider) via an Internet-optimised backbone.
Internet
Telephony or
Fax Service
The service is provided via ordinary telephones or fax machines, but is routed through
the Internet via the ISP’s telecommunication switch.  Quality is lower than current
telephone services but similar to older satellite technology.  ISPs rely on having
switching capability at the destination, which became available in 1998 through ISP
membership services.
Interconnection
Agreement
An agreement between two telecommunications services providers, exchanging traffic
between the respective networks.  The agreement includes quality of service and
payment buy one for the  use of use of the other’s network.
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Table 1 continued
ISDN High bandwidth service to a location which offers two or more telephone lines at higher
speed that the normal 128 Kbps on telephone lines.
ISP A service provider that connects the customer to the Internet via dial-up modems, or
high-speed data service connected to telecommunication switches for routing.  The ISP
will lease bandwidth from the national infrastructure service provider such as Telecom
New Zealand.  The ISP will also often provide its own web site for information and
entertainment and may cache (or store) commonly used web sites around the world for
faster/cheaper retrieval. ISPs often provide value-added services such as customer web
site design and storage.
Gateway Telecommunication switch that provides international access.  Internet and voice
telephony gateways are usually separated.
Point of
Presence  (POP)
This is the term used for an ISP’s telecommunication switch located in a particular area.
The customer calls a local number and the ISP is “present” in that location.  The data
from the customer is then routed from the ISP’s switch through the ISP’s gateway to
either a national or international Internet site.
Toll Calls Calls that are billed per minute and may be either national or international calls but are
outside the free-calling region defined in the Kiwi Share.
VPN Virtual Private Network.  This is a private network created for organisations with more
than one location.  The private network is normally created through a
telecommunications leased line service.  The Internet Service Providers have created
private networks on the public Internet through passwords, firewalls and other security
measures.
Prior to 1987, only Telecom New Zealand was permitted to provide telecommunications services.
Telecom New Zealand was part of the New Zealand Post Office until 1986, when it became a
state-owned enterprise (SOE) under the 1986 SOE Act.  Telecom was fully privatised in 1991
through the sale of 98% of shares to Bell Atlantic and Ameritech, with the requirement that more
than 50% of total shares were to be issued to the public within a specified period.  Telecom is a
completely vertically integrated service provider within New Zealand, owning the local loop almost
exclusively, owning the most extensive national network infrastructure, and operating the first
13
international gateway. Telecom is the main provider of the national tolls network and 0800 numbers.
In addition, Telecom, through its subsidiary, Netway, operates a national Internet gateway,
exchanging most international Internet traffic.  Telecom also has extensive interconnection
agreements and partnerships that provide access to international bandwidth.  Low cost international
bandwidth is a great advantage for the Internet, as most web sites are located in the US.
At the time of privatisation, the government sold its capital holdings and investments in
telecommunications but retained the “Kiwi share”, which requires free local calls for all residents,
limits residential line rental rates, and specifies a relationship between rural and urban customers’
rental fees.
In 1991, Clear Communications, a joint venture among four local and overseas businesses - British
Telecom, MCI, Todd Corporation, and TVNZ3 - began offering a toll service in New Zealand,
using a long-distance interconnection agreement with Telecom, and began to build a fibre optic cable
networks with national coverage4.  In 1995, Bell South (now Vodafone) began a mobile service;
and in 1996 Saturn began to build a local access cable and telephony network in the Wellington
region.  Rivalry between Clear and Telecom dates from difficulty in obtaining agreement on local call
interconnection contracts.  An extensive legal battle went to New Zealand’s highest court of
adjudication, the Privy Council, before an agreement was reached in 1995.  Clear’s initial market
focus was in the international and long distance tolls market where it quickly captured 20% of the
market.  Clear has avoided entering the market for local loop provision except in the major central
business districts, choosing to focus on higher value business customers.  Clear argues its customer
base is limited to new or relocating businesses due to a range of issues including number portability5.
Thus, the telecommunications infrastructure is largely owned and maintained by the largest service
provider, Telecom New Zealand, although some companies own small private networks that feed
into the national network.  Most major telecommunications companies own gateways that provide
direct access to international networks.
                                                                
3 Now 100% owned by British Telecom.
4 Clear Communications’ effort to develop a national fibre optic network was greatly assisted by long-term
contracts with New Zealand Railways Corporation to 1993 and then TranzRail.  TranzRail, the national railway
company, runs fibre optic cabling along its rail system.
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The market is characterised by light handed regulation under the provisions of the Commerce Act
1986. The Act sets out conduct that inhibits efficient economic mechanisms and prevents
competition.  Grievances are usually brought before the Commerce Commission, the administrator
of the Act.  Section 36 and 36A of the Act are intended to prohibit monopolistic behaviour by
dominant firms for anti-competitive purposes.  The prohibition is against misuse of market power.
There have been a large number of complaints made against the incumbent Telecom to the
Commerce Commission over a variety of matters, including predatory pricing and anti-competitive
interconnection agreements, that to date have not been upheld.
An Internet Service Provider is defined as an entity that provides access to the Internet as its
primary function.  Internet access has been available to the public since 1994 but was first available
some 10 years earlier to some academic and government institutions.  Since 1996, most ISPs have
begun to provide additional services as a way of diversifying into higher value products.  ISPs are
considered members of the telecommunications service industry since they provide access to the
Internet via the telecommunications infrastructure (which includes telephone service, leased-line
services, data communication, and billing). Internet access is one of the many services provided by
telecommunications companies.
Lists of ISPs are provided in Appendices B and C, with major/national ISPs in Appendix B and
minor/regional ISPs in Appendix C.  The ISPs are separated by coverage area. National ISPs are
those which have advertised their services in all major cities: Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.
The table lists locations of points-of-presence (POP).  The location of POPs in the table signifies
coverage area for an ISP.  All customers making a local call within the POP free call area are not
charged toll fees.  In 1996, most ISPs had limited national coverage.  Voyager had full national
coverage because users outside a POP free call area could make use of a toll free number for an
additional hourly fee, which was about twice the free call hourly rate.  Xtra did not have full national
coverage until 1998 but had the largest number of POPs, meaning that a large percentage of
potential users could access the service without toll charges.  In late 1998, Telecom introduced a
service for Internet traffic in order to get this traffic off the national network.  This new service,
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 Telecom claims that it owns all its numbers and a customer must change numbers to switch to Clear or another
carrier.  A number portability agreement was reached in early 1999.
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IPNet, has eliminated competition between ISPs on the basis of POPs.  Any customer can now call
their ISP via IPNet with no toll charge.  The ISPs must purchase the service from Telecom. Thus,
the consumer dials a local number, which connects them to their ISP’s server for Internet access.
ISPs not using IPNet must continue to rely on POPs or toll-free numbers.  In addition, customers
whose ISP is not on IPNet pay a surcharge of 2¢ per minute.
Most competitors in the industry sell Internet access and other related telecommunications services
through bandwidth leased from a data communication network, either that of Telecom, Clear,
Saturn, BCL or other provider6.  Companies then repackage this into amounts usable by individuals
and companies.  Internet access through either dial-up or high speed data connections is a
repackaging of the leased bandwidth, and thus the provision of Internet access has become a new
market, a subfield within the telecommunications industry.  A subfield of a main industry is one in
which either new customers emerge for the products or services of a well-established industry, or
products or services emerge as new developments in a well-established industry. The subfield of
Internet access can be characterised by low barriers to entry, low costs to customers who switch
between ISPs, and minimal differentiation.
Entry barriers to the IP market are low.  All that is required to start an ISP company is an Internet
server ($5,000 to $20,000) and leased bandwidth. Since the leased service can be paid for
monthly, it is easy to adjust costs as required.  Switching costs are low.  Changing ISPs requires the
customer to pay a connection fee to the new ISP, obtain a new email address and install some new
software.  The differentiation of products that does exist is in response to the individual needs of the
customer.  The factors in determining the level of service include price, speed of access, consistency
of access, and help available to the customer.  For example, an experienced Internet customer is
most likely to want a low monthly price and high access speed, but minimal help.  The level of
service required for business versus residential customers is distinguished by consistency of access
since a business customer requires greater dependability of access.  Switching costs are also likely
to be higher for some business users due to the need to change email address but this may be
avoided by purchasing a domain name.
                                                                
6 These other providers may include firms with microwave transmitting equipment or even ISPs themselves as
they develop their own infrastructure.
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To summarise the key features of ISP services: their up-front capital cost is very low, customer
switching costs are low, especially for those entities with a domain name, and while there is some
variation in service characteristics, they are sufficiently similar to be regarded as almost
homogeneous.  There have been variations over time in the quality of services that have affected
service characteristics and the relative demands for ISPs.
3.0 Market Entry Literature
This section of the paper reviews an area of the business strategy literature relating to market entry.
It discusses how the nature and quantity of resources of a firm affect the timing of its market entry;
and the effects of entry into a new subfield of an industry, with particular reference to the relationship
between the Internet market and the telecommunications market. Much of the literature discusses
entry into an industry with a product.  However, it also discusses products that require a continuing
relationship with the customer, such as medical imaging, automobiles and pacemakers. This literature
is considered relevant to the current case because telecommunication service providers are
providing access to a network, either telephony or data communication, and included in this access
service is customer billing software and consultation.  Consequently, the user will have a continuing
relationship with the provider, although a user can switch to alternative providers with some incurred
costs.  For example, customers are billed monthly and have contact each time they log in to their
ISP.
Market entry from an economic perspective is characterised by Bain (Bensanko 1996) as entry
reaction and retaliation. Bain describes four possible strategic responses an incumbent can take
relative to new entrants into its market.  The first is to deter the new entrants from entering the
market through control of essential inputs.  The second response is to attempt to block the new
entrants by explicitly signalling a lower cost structure. Signalling to a competitor is clearly and
explicitly indicating a firm’s intended strategy through advertising, press releases or actions taken.  If
new entrants are unable to differentiate their products, then they are expected not to enter the
market because their higher cost structure will prevent them from competing with the incumbent on
price.  The third strategy is to signal to the entrantsprior to their entering the market that a predatory
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price will be charged after entry.  Predatory pricing involves a firm setting a price lower than the cost
structure of competitors, and without regard to its own cost structure.  The incumbent cannot
credibly continue this strategy without significant cash flows to cover possible extended losses.  The
fourth strategy is one of accommodation of new entrants.  This strategy is most likely in cases where
the market has low barriers to entry or high cost of deterrence.
In the economics and strategy literatures, an incumbent is defined in somewhat different terms.
Generally, the incumbent is a current provider of goods or services in an industry that has been in the
industry for a long period and has a substantial market share.  In the economics literature, the
incumbent may, depending upon various barriers to entry, have enough market power to be able to
influence the market through price setting, controlling distribution channels or product inputs, or
setting quality standards.  In the strategy literature, the incumbent is assumed to be a stable firm
within that industry to be contrasted with the new entrant.  Besides being a stable member of the
industry and having some success in gaining market share over a period of time, the incumbent is
generally described as a firm that has developed a set of resources through its past successes.  The
incumbent has a secure, well-defined market share and is established within the industry.  The power
of the incumbent to influence the market is imperfectly indicated by its market share relative to other
incumbent firms and directly affected by barriers to entry.  The set of resources a firm accumulates
from past successes includes financial, infrastructure and capital, both human and organisational.
These resources support the firm’s continued success in a stable or slowly changing industry.  In
both classes of literature, dominance in an industry may be gained through a controlling market
share, which is not under credible threat of entry.
Caves and Porter (1977) extend Bain’s framework by defining the decision of how to react to the
new entrant in terms of an investment decision under uncertainty.  They generalise the decision of
both the new entrant and the incumbent, using the following investment decision criteria:7
(1) Expected income after entry
(2) Actual static or structural barriers to entry
                                                                
7 Caves and Porter pp. 242.
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(3) Expected reaction of the other firms in the market or those expected to enter
(4) Relevant resources possessed by the new entrant
(5) Sunk costs in making the decision to enter.
Gruca et al. (1995) create a similar framework for reaction to a new entrant, one that is commonly
referenced in the strategy literature.  It includes
(1) The competitive environment of the industry – Are products differentiable?  Is there a
dominant firm?  Is the industry populated by a few firms or several?
(2) Choice of strategy of the new entrant.
(3) Consequences that current entry strategy and subsequent entry decisions have on the current
firms in the industry.
In both the economics and strategy literatures, the process by which a firm decides to enter a market
depends on the nature and quantity of resources that the firm has available to apply to entry, and the
environmental factors in the industry. The economics literature typically assumes that each firm,
whether deciding to enter a new market or reacting to a new entrant, is a rational decision-maker
wishing to maximise profit.  A key component of identifying a firm’s strategic behaviour is the time
frame over which profit is maximised.  Bain’s framework assumes that each incumbent has the
resources to implement the best strategic reaction.  Robinson et al. (1992) point out that both Bain’s
and Gruca’s frameworks assume firms have access to necessary applicable resources in relation to
timing of market entry and their relative size in the industry.  In reality, each firm has specific
characteristics that either helps or prevents it from using all available resources to successfully enact
the appropriate strategy: any discussion of market entry must include the industry environment,
timing and individual firm characteristics.
In contrast, “resource-based analysis”, a terminology introduced in Barney (1991), focuses primarily
on the internal elements of the firm that give it a competitive advantage: that is, the firm’s internal
strengths and weaknesses in terms of its ability to compete against other firms.  Sinha and Noble
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(1997) describe the resource-based view in the following way: “a firm develops, protects and
leverages its own relatively unique strategic assets while attempting to imitate or eliminate the
strategic assets of competing firms.”8  Many authors in the strategic management literature use
different terms for resources interchangeably: strategic assets, leveraged assets, core competencies,
dominant logic9, and resources and capabilities.   Barney (1996) points out that while these terms
are used interchangeably and have roughly the same meaning, the term “core competencies”, as first
described by Prahalad and Hamel (1994), is usually reserved for resources that may be used for
diversification.  All of these terms refer to a set of resources a particular firm possesses that are
applicable to the firm’s competitive environment and provide a competitive advantage.  For example
a firm that has developed a successful distribution channel may consider this distribution channel to
be a resource if other firms in industry find it difficult to rapidly create a distribution channel of these
same qualities.
Barney (1996) generalises a firm’s resources into four categories
Financial capital: Money resources:  cash flows, liquid capital,
stock value
Physical capital: Technology, plant, equipment, geographical
location
Human capital: Training, experience, judgement or insight of
individuals or managers
Organisational capital: Formal reporting structures, planning, control
and co-ordinating systems or informal
relationships with suppliers and customers.
He evaluates these resources in terms of their value, rareness, imitability and organisation.  This
evaluation criterion is applied to a snapshot of the firm’s assets.  Over time the value of human
capital, for instance, may translate into increased value in financial capital through profits.  The value
                                                                
8 Sinha and Noble (1997), pp. 468.
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of a resource is determined by its ability to enable the firm to respond to environmental threats.  The
term “rareness” is applied with respect to the number of other competitors in a market who have
these resources, whether competing firms are at a cost disadvantage when trying to duplicate or
create substitutes for these resources, and whether the firm is organised in such a way so as to be
able to exploit the full potential of these resources.   The usefulness of the resource to the firm
depends on the four properties; and may determine whether a firm entering a new market will have a
competitive advantage over its likely competitors.
Entrants into a market are classified in Robinson et al. (1992) according to the timing of their entry
relative to the lifecycle stage of the industry.  Early entrants into an emerging market are identified as
“market pioneers”.  Firms that follow these pioneers as the market becomes identifiable, are called
“early followers”.  Firms that enter a fully defined market, with clear market segments, are classified
as “late entrants”.  There is a diverse body of literature to discuss why the new market has
materialised (see Tushman and Anderson (1986)) and will not be discussed here.  The main focus of
this study is to describe the timing of entrants and what advantages they may gain from that timing
relative to their resources in determining their eventual place in the market.  The concepts of value,
rareness, imitability, and organisational support when evaluating resources provide a way to rank a
firm’s resources and thus its ability to compete in the current environment.  When evaluating
resources in a market entry decision, these properties must be assessed relative to the entry timing
strategy rather than as absolute properties of a resource.
Previous work in the strategy literature follows two distinct methods of analysing the timing of
market entrance.  The “Absolute Pioneer Advantage theory” or “first mover advantage” is evaluated
in Lieberman and Montgomery (1988).  This theory states that market pioneers are intrinsically
stronger, and have a competitive advantage from being the first entrants into a new market.  These
firms gain their strength through developing the necessary skills and resources to compete efficiently.
Robinson et al. (1992) go further in asserting that a firm’s given set of skills and resources does not
determine a particular order of market entry but increases the probability that a firm will choose a
particular type of entry.   Lambkin and Day (1989) test this assertion and further argue that smaller
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
9 Dominant logic of a firm, for example marketing systems used for competitive advantage.
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firms are more able to quickly respond to changes in the product or market.  These smaller, more
flexible firms are better suited as either market pioneers (prior to competition entering the market) or
late entrants (able to respond quickly to changes in product demand).  Mitchell (1991) extends the
idea that a particular skill set or resource set creates greater success when a firm times its entry to
make best use of these resources.  In his empirical study of the medical imagery industry, he found
that firms whose parent organisations had higher-value applicable resources were most likely to
succeed as early followers.  The early follower applies its resources to a market with less risk than
the market pioneer and less competition than met by the late entrant.
In his study of market entry in the US automobile manufacturing industry, Carroll (1996) classifies
the entrants based on their bundle of resources.  A new entrant may be classified as possessing an
entrepreneurial set of resources.  An established entrant brings a set of resources, developed in
another market, that is useful in this new market.  Most literature agrees that older organisations also
often have “baggage” that prevents them from responding quickly to changes in market demand.
Carroll (1996) contradicts the notion that years of experience in an industry increases the probability
of survival.  He postulates that organisational resources are the primary reason for increased survival
rates.  Empirical results from the US automobile manufacturing industry show that the established
entrant owes its success in the new market to the difficulty competitors have in replicating its
resources, rather than the age of the firm.  Carroll compared bicycle, carriage, and engine
manufacturers’ entrance into the US automobile industry.  In this study, operational and product
distribution skills increased survival rates.  Results also showed that newer firms are less likely to
have the financial resources to carry out proper planning prior to market entry.  Mitchell (1994) also
asserts that these established firms often have better financial and physical capital and personnel
resources, and Levinthal (1991) finds that these firms are more likely to focus on longer-term
success in a new market.
The second method of analysing timing to market entry relies upon the resource-based analysis
approach.  Abell (1978) discusses a “strategic window” where a firm’s specific resources or
competencies best fit the market requirements.  Firms that enter during this “strategic window” are
most likely to have a competitive advantage.  Kerin et al. (1992) extend this concept by stating that
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matching resources at time of market entry with market conditions creates a sustainable competitive
advantage.  They define the order of entry as being conditional upon the following effects: product
development time, scope economies, search characteristics of the good, rate of technical change of
the good, demand uncertainty, process and product innovation, investment in co-specialised assets,
buyer purchase frequency, and market instability.  Szymanski et al. (1995) describe a particular case
from their empirical analysis:
“The most logical late entrant might, for example, be one that can more effectively capitalize
on their current product portfolio and new product market opportunities as uncertainties
diminish.  Late entrants may also excel at marketing – superior marketing skills can be
crucial for identifying overlooked niche markets.”10
Much of the initial work concerning market entry looked at the emergence of a completely new
market.  Later work has focused on entry into new subfields of a currently established industry.
Mitchell (1991) defines a subfield as a new market that emerges following a significant technological
advancement in an industry.  Sinha and Nobel (1997) describe the emergence of a subfield as a
chance to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage in an otherwise stable and mature industry.
The cause of the change in the industry to create this new subfield may have relevance to a firm
deciding whether its resources in the main market are relevant to the new subfield.
Stinchcombe (1965) describes an industry lifecycle as being defined by two phases.  The first phase
has great growth spurts with the founding of many organisations.  The second follows as a stable
period with slow growth.  Based upon some events, the industry returns to the first and then the
second phase in a cyclical fashion.  This “punctuated equilibrium” of changes in stability and growth
are traditionally attributed to changes in the environment.  This model assumes that an industry
doesn’t die but transforms itself as product demand changes.  Abernathy and Clark (1985) define
these changes as innovations in technology, changes in government policy or regulation, or changes
in consumer preferences.  Swaminathan (1998) defines a mature industry as one having a few
dominant firms, high barriers to entry and a low rate of new entrants.  Thus competitors in the
mature industry are stable in number and have evolved so that their resources are applicable to the
                                                                
10 Szymanski et al. (1995) pp. 23.
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industry and are not easily imitable.  Scherer (1980) describes the case of a few dominant firms
being generalist firms taking advantage of economies of scale.  In his study of microbreweries in the
US brewing industry, Swaminathan (1998) describes the impetus for a new entry into a mature
industry as coming from either exogenous or endogenous sources.  The exogenous cause is created
by a discontinuity in the industry’s environment.  The endogenous changes occur because the
generalist firms do not serve the customers at the edges of the market well and thus new entrants can
survive on the periphery of the industry.  The exogenous factors that precipitate new entry into a
mature industry are the same factors that create a subfield, such as changes in manufacturing process
or technology.  Thus a subfield is created from a mature industry due to environmental changes that
the incumbents could not have planned for with their current set of resources.  New entrants in a
peripheral area of a mature industry signal the creation of a subfield that is offering different products
to the incumbents.  This subfield will begin its own lifecycle of dramatic growth followed by stability.
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) found evidence to suggest that the new entrants into a subfield will gain
above-normal economic rates of return if their resources are not highly imitable.  Mansfield (1981)
found that the first entrants to a subfield with imitable resources do not have a sustainable
competitive advantage.
There is clearly a dichotomy between the Absolute Pioneer Advantage theory and the resource-
based theory.  In one case, the market pioneers will become the market leaders, and in the other
case the firm that best times its entrance, given its resources, will gain sustained competitive
advantages.  Mitchell (1991) attempts to explain these two concepts with the idea that different
types of entrants are on different “clocks”.  A “clock” can be defined as the time of formation of the
subfield until a firm enters that subfield.  The concept of dual-clocks is complementary to the idea of
strategic fit between resources and order of entry into a market.
Mitchell (1991) presents the idea that new entrants into the market as a whole and incumbents in the
main industry are on different clocks for order of entry into a subfield. His basic premise is that two
separate clocks exist: clock-1 records the order of entry of each firm to the subfield, and clock-2
records the order of entry of the incumbents active in the main industry.  Clock-2 is a subset of
clock-1 containing only those firms that possess applicable resources.  The gap between clock-1
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and clock-2 represents the time it takes to replicate the incumbent’s resources or specialised assets.
For example, if firm A enters 18 months before firm B, and firm B possesses applicable resources to
the subfield then, assuming both firms are successful in capturing market share, the theory states that
it took firm A 18 months to duplicate firm B’s resources.
In the framework of resource-based analysis, Mitchell defines the incumbents’ specialised assets as
characterising the individual firms, with every incumbent having a unique set of these assets.  These
specialised assets or resources are defined under Barney’s framework and are specifically
applicable or usable in the subfield.  A single resource may provide the incumbent with a competitive
advantage but it is more likely that the combination of resources provides the advantage.  Mitchell’s
empirical study of the US diagnostic imaging industry assumes that success in the subfield is defined
by the amount of market share the firm gains after entering the subfield.  His reasoning for using this
definition of successful performance is based upon the assertion that superior market share will lead
to survival in the subfield.
Mitchell’s (1991) empirical study concludes that an incumbent is better off entering the subfield later,
when uncertainties in product requirements and demands are diminished.  He further asserts that
timing of market entry is more important for incumbents than for new entrants.  Since all incumbents
share similar specialised assets, early incumbents may effectively be able to close out later
incumbents by capturing superior market share early.  Both incumbents, however, would benefit by
entering later than the market pioneers.  Thus, the order of entry between incumbents is a waiting
game.  The key is to be the first incumbent to enter, waiting for product or service demand to be
stable, yet not allowing the market pioneer to be able to duplicate assets.  The incumbent’s
specialised assets are valuable because the users attracted to this subfield are similar to those using
the products in the main industry, even though the products themselves may have changed.  Mitchell
does observe that participation in the main industry does not guarantee that the specialised assets
will be complementary to the subfield for all incumbents, but that the incumbents are more likely to
possess these assets.  The study did not distinguish between types of assets and there may be some
effect from an incumbent’s possession of more capital, enabling investment in the subfield with lower
risk to the firm. Thus, in a group of potential entrants into a subfield, the incumbents in the field that
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possess superior financial assets may have a competitive advantage over other incumbents in this
respect.
Mitchell also concedes that not all industries will experience this dual-clock phenomenon.  The key
to determining whether this situation exists in a given industry or subfield is whether incumbents
possess specialised assets that take time and substantial costs to replicate.  These assets or
resources have been developed prior to the creation of the subfield, usually over many years of
competing successfully in the main industry.  They often assist in the manufacturing, distribution or
service of a new product.  Any new entrant that possesses these applicable resources from another
industry should, in theory, receive the same benefit as the incumbent.  In practice, however,
incumbents from industries unrelated to the subfield will not possess the same type of resources.
Even though the early entrant acquires some specialised skills, these may not be enough to
overcome the broader skill-base of the later incumbent. New entrants that attempt to purchase
resources through acquisitions or mergers often change the resources set through the change of
ownership process and may not gain the same benefits as the incumbent prior to purchase.  Thus the
dual-clock phenomenon is most relevant in industries that have provided incumbents the time in
which to acquire assets.
Banbury and Mitchell (1995) extends the concept of separate clocks for new entrants and
incumbents to include incremental product innovations.  Mitchell (1991) defines a subfield as a
“significant” technical innovation.  Banbury and Mitchell (1995) define a product innovation as
something less radical: “important incremental product innovations that are product refinements and
extensions of established designs that result in substantial price or functional benefits to users.”11
The concept of incremental innovations can be applied to an industry or a subfield in which the early
growth stage has subsided and subsequent actions effect market share.  Banbury and Mitchell’s
empirical study of the US pacemaker industry concluded that, in general, firms that continue to
innovate are more able to respond quickly to an evolving industry.  Furthermore, the incumbent that
introduces the innovation is more likely to gain market share over any new entrant.  The incumbent’s
specialised assets often create a competitive advantage over the new entrant because the incumbent
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does not need to develop distribution and marketing systems at the same time that they are
expending resources on product innovations.  Banbury and Mitchell conclude that:
“by being first to market with incremental innovations, firms protect their market share from
competitive erosion.  Simply put, if somewhat figuratively, it is better for a firm to cannibalize
itself than be eaten by its competitors.”
Thus the incumbent may have an advantage by entering a subfield later, but must continue to monitor
the timing of innovations in order to maintain market share.  The study did find that later adopters
have some advantages when an innovation created a further market segmentation.
From the market entry literature, we can conclude that though first-movers in a new market may
obtain substantial market share, their gains are not necessarily sustainable.  The incumbent who
comes from an industry with complementary resources, specialised assets, or skills will have
competitive advantages in the new market that allow later successful entry with less risk.  Any entry
into a new market involves risk derived from unknowns such as eventual size of demand and
product requirements.  Waiting to enter a subfield after its uncertain birth process eliminates some
unknowns, thus decreasing risk.  These specialised assets have a good chance of being
complementary when the incumbent enters a subfield of the industry in which they already
participate.  Many of the systems that have led to success in the main industry will be of benefit in
the subfield.
These benefits also continue as products in the subfield are continually modified.  Thus, when
managers weigh up the potential benefits of entering a new market, they should first take stock of the
firm’s resources or special assets, as resource analysis would dictate.  The next step is to create a
strategy for market entry that includes timing of entry in relation to the firm’s resources.  The key is
for the incumbent manager to wait until the subfield becomes stable, yet be the first incumbent to
enter.  The work presented has illustrated that waiting to enter a new market may in fact be
advantageous for incumbents relative to the actions of other entrants.
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
11 Branbury and Mitchell (1995), pp. 161.
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This concludes the review of the management entry strategy literature.  Its applicability to the
Internet market will depend upon the complementary resources actually provided by the incumbent
and the extent to which the incumbent firm’s subsidiary (entrant) has a comparative advantage in
their use.  As identified, an ISP requires access to bandwidth and a server, neither of which places
high demands on capital.  Any ISP may access the incumbent’s services, but some small
comparative advantage may accrue to an incumbent’s ISP subsidiary due to information held about
the parent’s network services, and managerial communication. In addition to anticipated profits to
be obtained in the new market, the incumbent subsidiary’s entry to the Internet subfield, and the
extent to which it has been supported financially, may well be influenced by a perceived need for the
parent firm to retain its customer base.  Although the ultimate effect of the Internet on the
telecommunications industry is unknown, there may be advantages in retaining or developing final-
use customer relationships.  If so, then telecommunications companies may seek to achieve this by
developing their own Internet service providers.
4.0 Growth of the Internet Service Provider Market in New
Zealand
In this section, I describe the growth of the Internet market in New Zealand, focusing on the
development of ISP’s over the period 1996-1999. The discussion is based on an extensive search
of the Reuters database. First, a search was made based on all articles published in New Zealand
with the word “Internet” contained within the article.  These articles were further filtered for content
regarding ISPs. A list of all companies providing Internet access in 1996 (the time the Internet
access subfield became commercialised) is provided by a New Zealand guide to the Internet,
“Wired Kiwis” (Wiggins 1996). The web pages of the ISPs also provided information about the
industry.  Little information is known about some early ISPs that closed prior to the start of this
study (1996).
This study focuses primarily on the ten largest ISPs in New Zealand, as defined by market share.  A
summary of significant events relating to these ISPs is provided in Appendix A and the narrative
should be read in conjunction with this appendix.
28
The development is divided into four distinct stages, according to the level of competitive reaction to
events such as the entry of new competitors and subsequent changes in pricing strategies. Changes
to the demand side of the market, such as the segmentation of consumers, are a factor in the
development of the market but their role is not explored here.  The description emphasises the timing
of entry of telecommunications service providers relative to the earlier entry of smaller ISPs, and
classifies each ISP by the resources it possessed at entry.
Stage 0 is characterised by a small number of Internet users and collegial competition between
access providers.  There is no relatively large firm, competition between firms is minimal and market
penetration is very low.  Stage 1 sees Internet access companies run as businesses rather than as
clubs or hobbies.  Competition becomes fierce and a relatively large player emerges.  Stage 2 begins
a more stable period after the non-survivors have left the industry.  Prices are more stable and ISPs
can be classified into generalists and nichers.  Internet users are growing by about 100% a year.
ISPs have cut prices to remain competitive, and they seek to provide other telecommunication
services that produce higher margins than Internet access service.  Stage 3 sees the emergence of
the larger ISPs as direct competitors to the telecommunications providers, and another round of
price competition.
4.1 Stage 0: Prior to April 1996
Pre-commercialisation of the Internet in New Zealand
From 1995 to early 1996, there were two distinct market segments, not-for-profit providers and
for-profit providers.  The primary difference between these two segments was motivation for
providing Internet access.  The not-for-profits were primarily concerned with providing service to
their constituencies and covering the costs of service.  The for-profit entities sought financial gain
from providing service.
The not-for-profit organisations can further be broken down into universities and polytechnics, and
co-operatives.  The universities and polytechnics were principally motivated by the need to provide
Internet access for their staff and students.  These educational institutions created infrastructures on
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their campuses, and in the early days some of them sought to recover some of their costs by using
excess capacity to extend services into their local communities.  Providers in this market segment
included: Taranaki Polytech, Canterbury University, Victoria University (now for-profit NetLink),
Waiariki Polytech, and Wanganui Polytech.  Much of the costs were covered by the information
technology (IT) infrastructure of the institution and the service was managed by the campus IT staff.
The majority of users had some affiliation with the institution. There were few business users.
The other type of not-for-profit organisation was the co-operative.  Some of these were local
community groups attempting to provide Internet access to small and rural towns not serviced by the
educational institutions and for-profits.  These organisations collected money in order to pay for
these services and were usually run by volunteers. Examples include the REAPs (Regional Education
Activities Programmes), which provided Internet service to high school students and later to the
surrounding communities.  As can be seen from the ISP list in Appendix C, REAPS are still located
in rural towns.  Other co-operatives included PlaNet and PlaNet Free New Zealand.  Some of the
original co-operatives are now run on a profit-making basis and have created niches for their
services by focusing on particular groups/issues e.g., Christians, Gays, and environmental groups.
The for-profit ISPs can be segmented into homegrown organisations and those started by offshore
organisations. The homegrown organisations were based around the three main population centres
of Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch.  Often, individuals wanting to use their technical skills to
capitalise on a need in the marketplace started these organisations.  The best example of this type of
organisation is Internet Users Group (now known as Ihug).  Tim and Nick Wood started this service
in the basement of their home in Auckland but demand quickly grew and several moves of premise
were necessary.  Other ISPs in this category include ICONZ, IproLink, NetLink, Actrix, SouthNet,
and TpNetLink.12  Several computer stores also tried to capitalise on the new interest in accessing
the Internet.  These organisations include CompKarori, Comnet (predominately switching
technology), Eastern Southland Internet, Plain Communications, and PC Net.  An entrepreneurial
spirit that overcame a lack of financial and management resources typifies these homegrown firms.
The users of these services tended to be similar to those who subscribed to the non-profit services,
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but they either had no affiliation with a service-providing institution, or were seeking greater access
than email and occasional Internet surfing, which was limited by pricing and speed of access. Some
were early business users of the Internet.
Internet service was also provided in New Zealand by offshore organisations - Microsoft,
CompuServe, IBM Global Networks, and Voyager. Voyager was started as a joint venture
between OzEmail and two New Zealand entrepreneurs, with OzEmail13 providing most of the
Internet access expertise. Voyager is an exception to this classification because OzEmail’s resources
and character is closer to the case of a New Zealand homegrown ISP. OzEmail’s financial and
capital resources were limited and the owners relied on their desire to succeed rather than access to
overseas assets.   The majority of users of these services were businesses that required a high level
of reliability and bandwidth.
Demand for Internet access through this period was small but growing steadily.  Some price
competition existed but most variation was due to differentiation based on service.  For example,
customers paid a premium to CompuServe for access to its extensive information databases.  Fee
structures consisted of a membership fee and usage fee based on Mbytes downloaded.
4.2 Stage 1: Mid 1996 – December 1997
Commercialisation of the Internet
At the start of 1996, there were more than 30 ISPs in New Zealand.  Most of these ISPs served
regional markets while Voyager, CompuServe and IBM served the national market.  The largest
ISP in New Zealand in terms of market share was Voyager.  Voyager was 80% owned by OzEmail
and 20% owned by local New Zealand entrepreneurs.14  OzEmail was the largest ISP in Australia
but had only recently translated this status into commercial success by recouping part of its heavy
investment in new technology. OzEmail/Voyager was beginning to gain a reputation as first firm to
market with each incremental technological improvement.  The next largest ISPs with national
coverage were IBM and CompuServe, both operating out of the US.  These two providers
                                                                
13 OzEmail has the second largest subscriber base in Australia.
14 OzEmail now owns 100% of Voyager.
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concentrated on providing service to business users.  All the ISPs were roughly price competitive,
with the exception of IBM and CompuServe, which charged a premium.
Voyager focused on the home user with little technical expertise.  Prior to Xtra’s entry, Voyager’s
prices led the competition.  Voyager had six POPs in New Zealand, all in major population centres.
Most customers could access the service outside the POP local calling area via 0800 toll free
numbers.
CompuServe had distinct advantages due to its large presence in the US market, which gave it
access to management and software expertise not available to the other national competitors.
CompuServe also had an international reputation for the high informational content of its web site.
Non-subscribers regularly requested access to the site content, and CompuServe later split site
access from the Internet access business to maximise profitability.  IBM had a large international
telecommunications network and was able to offer prices based upon a cost structure that made use
of that network.  IBM also had several large business customers in New Zealand, and was a trusted
name with these institutions.
Each of these national competitors had a similar pricing structure for their services and offered either
a local calling number or an 0800 (free) calling service.
The smaller ISPs, such as The Internet Users Group (Ihug), NetLink, Actrix and The Internet
Company of New Zealand (ICONZ), generally targeted customers in their local calling area and
focused on business users within that region. Only Ihug actively pursued a national focus.  Though
most of its customers were in Auckland, Ihug secured bandwidth capacity from a source external to
Telecom.15  By late in 1996, these smaller ISPs began to offer limited data transmission services
with their spare capacity.  Internet telephony service was available in 1996 but limitations in the
technology constrained uptake until 1998.  Actrix offered a national Internet service in November
1998 with use of a toll-free number.
                                                                
15 External sources include trans-Tasman service via satellite, an agreement with SITA (an international airline
communications company) for their excess capacity, and an Auckland-based wireless service using radio
transmitters.  These sources are separate from any bandwidth that Telecom provides to ISP.
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Competition among ISPs changed dramatically in mid-1996 with the entrance of Xtra, a business
unit of Telecom New Zealand.  As noted above, Telecom has a commanding competitive position in
the telecommunications industry in New Zealand arising from its ownership of a large part of the
national telecommunications infrastructure, including local access.  Most customers call their ISPs
locally using Telecom owned lines to the ISP’s switch or via a toll-free number.
During 1996 and 1997, Xtra was run separately from Telecom.  Separate staff were hired to
develop Xtra.  Equipment to provide Internet access was purchased.  Xtra did not signal its
relationship with Telecom in advertisements and news announcements.  However, staff were located
within Telecom buildings and had access to Telecom management staff.  The Xtra technical staff also
had unfettered physical access to the Telecom network for installing, testing and maintaining their
own equipment. Most importantly, Telecom was funding the venture and seemed to have an open-
ended timeline for success.  During 1998, Xtra was re-branded as Telecom Xtra and Telecom
admitted that it did not expect to recoup costs for another two to three years16.  Xtra maintains that,
due to its bulk purchasing, it pays Telecom less for telecommunications access than do other ISPs17.
When Xtra entered the market in 1996, the stated goal was to obtain 50% of all new Internet users.
(In fact, during 1996, Internet connections grew at a rate of 17% per month.18)  Xtra did several
things differently from ISPs already in the market.  First, the set-up fees it charged users were much
lower than those charged by many competitors. Second, charging was on a time basis rather than by
usage (Mbytes), thereby making it easier for users to estimate charges. Third, Internet charges were
placed on the telephone bill, allowing users to make one payment for all Telecom services.  Fourth,
their connection package was tailored to the inexperienced computer user and their web site was
designed for the home customer seeking information and entertainment. The site was elaborate by
New Zealand standards, and Xtra used it to create brand identity.  One aim was evidently to draw
more home computer users into the market.
In anticipation of Xtra’s launch, Voyager announced its intention to add POPs to supplement the six
already operating.  More POPs would increase the number of customers who could access the
                                                                
16 Telecom 1998 Financial Statements
17 Quote from Xtra manager Chris Tyler to the press.
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service via a (free) local call.  Voyager also announced its intention to purchase additional servers.
Evidently, however, not all nodes or servers were purchased - OzEmail’s 1996/97 end of year
financial report claimed only 6 POPs in New Zealand.
During the first half of 1996, Voyager had problems with the fast growth of customers, as evidenced
by complaints of slow service and inability to fulfil customer requests.  Rumours circulated in the
press that Voyager was slow paying Telecom for wholesale services, and Voyager cut its 0800
number briefly in a dispute with Telecom. Due to the fast growth in subscribers, Xtra also had
significant problems in providing service, and there was negative press regarding technical help,
ability to connect, and service outages.  Most service complaints had stopped by mid-1997.
During Stage 1, Xtra made an additional significant change to their pricing schedule at entry into the
market. In August 1996 they cut their rates by 50% and their 0800 access prices to $1/hr below
Voyager19.
Xtra’s entry price was below other ISPs, but appeared to have only minor effects on competing
suppliers and customers.  The August 1996 pricing scheme, however, had a dramatic effect.  Many
smaller regional ISPs complained they were unable to compete, and 19 of the 80 ISPs in operation
at the start this phase either closed or stopped providing Internet access service.  IBM and
CompuServe did not match either pricing scheme, and also lost customers.  The international
infrastructure of these ISPs, and associated cheap bandwidth, was a competitive advantage in the
market prior to Xtra’s entry; but became a weakness with the entry of Xtra and some of the other
more competitive ISPs.  The international ISPs experienced high national costs, with few points-of-
presence, but had no advantage internationally, as Xtra, through Telecom, faced the either the same
or lower international costs.  Both CompuServe and IBM continued to lose market share and had
became insignificant competitors by the end of Stage 1.
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
18 Templeton, pp 25.
19 Voyager initially charged $6.95/hr and Xtra $4.95/hr but Voyager immediately dropped their price to $5.95/hr in
order to compete with Xtra’s price.
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Voyager was the other significant loser during this period, with its market share dropping from 38%
to 22%.  Voyager was unable to meet the new pricing regime due to its cost structure, which it
complained was largely dictated by Telecom, from whom it purchased bandwidth and 0800 service.
In November 1996, six months after Xtra’s launch, Clear Communications, New Zealand’s second
telecommunications service provider, launched its own ISP, ClearNet20. Clear’s initial investment in
the service was NZ$8 million and ClearNet started with 15 points of presence. ClearNet is a
business unit of Clear Communications and there was no pretence of separation between the two
entities - ClearNet uses the resources of Clear Communication as necessary.  Clear stated that its
competitive advantage would be in its ability to provide superior service.  ClearNet launched its
service with much less fanfare than Xtra and primarily offered service to existing customers, most of
which were businesses.  In 1997, ClearNet began focusing even more directly on business customer
needs, with increased offerings for value-added services such as hosting web sites and supplying
high-speed data services over the Internet.  The ClearNet pricing strategy was different to Xtra’s,
and was based on peak service demand times.  (See the ISP price list in Appendix B.)  At $5.95
per hour, ClearNet’s 0800-access service was unable to compete with Xtra’s offer. For whatever
reason, Clear decided that it could not match Xtra’s toll free pricing. Despite being less aggressive
on market entry, ClearNet quickly captured about 17% of the market and it maintained this share
throughout the period.
In general, although Clear Communications’ parent companies were well-resourced, it seems that
Clear may have had fewer resources available than Telecom.21  As may be expected, it targeted
large users.  Although it has built a national backbone, its bandwidth capacity is less than that of
Telecom.  Specifically, the backbone runs only through the main population centres.  Its organisation
is much smaller than Telecom’s and its customers are mostly confined to businesses in the CBD of
major population centres.  Its residential customers are mostly confined to Auckland.
                                                                
20 Clear announced their intention to start an Internet access service in July 1996, soon after figures were first
released showing Xtra’s phenomenal growth.
21 75% of Clear Communication was purchased by British Telecom in June 1999 which will may affect access to
resources.  MCI was the majority owner prior to British Telecom but Clear’s financial resources seem to have
been restricted parent owners.
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Ihug grew substantially during this period.  At the time of Xtra’s entry, Ihug began to offer a flat rate
service, backed by the bandwidth it had obtained from sources outside of New Zealand.  Its pricing
plan implied far lower charges for heavy Internet users (details in Section 4.5), and Ihug was able to
compete with the other firms in this small segment of the user population.  Financial success allowed
Ihug to grow, offering services nationally and in Australia by the end of Stage 1.
Other ISPs, such as NetLink, Actrix, ICONZ and some regional ISPs, maintained their customer
base but their overall market share did not grow with the major ISPs.  NetLink, for example, chose
to target business customers and de-emphasise residential customers.  This relegated them to a
small, profitable ISP in the Wellington region.
Stage 1 thus saw dramatic changes in competitor positions and pricing schemes:
· Xtra entered the market and quickly influenced prices and price structures, and expanded
market share.
· ClearNet, in a less aggressive manner, entered the market and followed Xtra’s actions,
becoming second in market share, targeting business customers and following Xtra’s strategic
behaviour.
· Ihug competed with a radically different pricing structure of a flat monthly rate, which it was
able to offer by sourcing bandwidth from other than Telecom and Clear.
· Voyager drifted from first to fourth in market position during this period, and was unable to
remain price competitive.
· CompuServe and IBM lost market share.
· Smaller and regional ISPs had to learn to compete in this new environment or exit the market.
The end of Stage 1 brought fewer accusations in the press about anti-competitive behaviour and
violations of net etiquette, and saw more stable market prices.  Xtra’s prices remained stable
through to the end of 1997 and, after their initial response, competitors also settled into a period of
stable prices. By the end of the period, all ISPs were experimenting with offering traditional
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telecommunications services such as ISDN and leased-lines to supplement their Internet access
revenue streams, which had decreased in profitability on a per-subscriber basis.
4.3 3 Stage 2: 1998
ISPs develop into “Little Telcos”
After the intense price competition of Stage 1, Stage 2 saw the Internet market move into a period
of stability , with a lower rate of exodus of providers.  The practice of offering telecommunications
services spread to smaller ISPs, and by the end of 1998, most ISPs offered some type of
telecommunication service focused on business customers.  Most of these services focused on data
communication, but some included forms of traditional voice telephony.  These services competed
directly with those of the telecommunications service providers, and frequently undercut their prices.
As marketing for these services grew, so did customer interest, and the ISPs, as subfield members,
were effectively competing with firms in the main industry in some areas.
By the beginning of Stage 2, the ISPs could be classified into two types: “generalists” and “nichers”.
The generalists, or “full service ISPs”, included Xtra, ClearNet and Voyager and can be defined as
those providing service to experienced and inexperienced users, high and low traffic users, and to
both business and residential customers. The companies invested resources in personnel, advertising
and technology to attract all customer types. It is apparent through the market share figures of Table
2 that Xtra and ClearNet had success in using this strategy.  Voyager, however, continued to lose
market share.  Of all the ISPs in the Internet subfield prior to Xtra’s entry, Voyager is the only ISP
remaining a generalist.  During Stage 2, customers could still identify Voyager (and its parent
OzEmail) by its early strategy as industry innovator. For example, Voyager introduced Internet
telephony more than a year before any other competitor, and developed an international network to
support the technology.  However, Voyager’s image as an innovator does not seem to have been
sufficient to retain its market share in an increasingly price-competitive market. Xtra and ClearNet
shifted during Stage 2 to place more emphasis on business customers, possibly to seek greater
margins.
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The rest of the ISPs can be classified as market nichers. These include Actrix, ICONZ, Iprolink,
NetLink, Ihug and all the smaller ISPs. Most of the regional ISPs maintained either a CBD or
regional focus.  For example, one ISP serving Palmerston North maintained a web page advertising
local events and the services of local businesses.  These ISPs were often more expensive than Xtra
but competed by meeting the needs of their local users.  Some ISPs focused on specific interest
groups, such as religious or environmental groups.  Other companies such as NetLink, focused on
the Internet and data communications needs of businesses, offering customers more options for
consulting and technology.  Ihug was the only regionally-based ISP in this stage to have pursued a
national subscriber base and business outside of New Zealand. At the end of Stage 1, it was a
major competitor in the Auckland region, but was struggling to launch an ISP and data
communication service in Sydney.  Ihug charged (and continues to charge) a flat monthly price for
the service (independent of time or Mbytes used) which has attracted heavy Internet users.  It also
continued to minimise its costs for bandwidth by using innovative contracts and alternative
technologies, such as satellite communications.  This strategy of expanding, reducing cost, and
concentrating on heavy users has paid off, as Ihug has grown to be the third most popular service in
the country.
Table 2 – Market Share of ISPs – Percentage of Total Customers
Jan 1997 June 1997 Jan 1998 June 1998 Jan 1999 June 1999
Xtra 40% 57% 44% 44% 38% 40%
Ihug unknown unknown 17% 15% 15% 16%
ClearNet No
reliable
figures
7% 19% 18% 18% 18%
Voyager 38% 22% 13% 8% 7% 6%
Total
accountsA
40,000 90,000 180,000 300,000 400,000 500,000
A Estimate based on a combination International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates and discussion in the press
Many of the small ISPs continued to survive due to the lack of free calling options from the major
ISPs outside of the population centres. However, the dynamics of competition began to change in
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late 1998 as more ISPs purchased bandwidth on IPNet.  IPNet is a network, separate from the
national network, which is specifically built for the transport of Internet traffic.  Using IPNet means
that any ISP is only a local call away regardless of its POPs.  IPNet contained some new technology
and was publicly trialled for approximately two months exclusively by Xtra, then was made available
to all ISPs.  ClearNet does not use IPNet services due to their own network investments.  Ihug uses
IPNet, but also uses other sources of bandwidth, including satellite services.  Although there are no
accurate figures, anecdotal information in the press would suggest many of the medium to smaller
ISPs have switched to IPNet.22
The major trend in this period was that more and more ISPs began to offer data communication
packages to businesses.  As shown in Appendices B and C, both the national and regional ISPs list
ISDN service packages, and many offer leased-line services.  These services provide businesses
with high-speed connections to the Internet.  For example, ISDN can access the Internet at a
bandwidth of 64kbps - 1.9Mbps.  The ISPs sometimes resell service provided by Telecom or
Clear, but many repackage their spare capacity to improve revenues.  Many ISPs also began in this
period to offer value-added services such as web page design, web page hosting and e-commerce
facilities, targeting small business that didn’t have this expertise.
A small number of new regional ISPs entered the market to fill under-represented market segments.
Most provided low cost service with minimal customer support. Whereas most of the major service
providers charged $2.50/hour for Internet access, these new entrants charged as low as $0.40/hour,
but provided little or no customer support. For example, Paradise.Net opened in 1998 as a small
ISP based in Wellington. The Paradise.Net customer was charged less than 20% of Xtra’s price
schedule but had little access to help desk support or installation guidelines.  None of the incumbents
have offered a similar service matching price and customer support levels.
During Stage 2, the number of Internet accounts in New Zealand grew by over 100%.  Users were
broadly segmented into residential and business customers.  A number of medium to small
businesses - possibly lured by the lower prices – began developing ways of utilising the Internet to
                                                                
22 More ISPs have switched to IPNet in late 1999 as a result of Telecom imposing a charge for all Internet users
accessing their service for more than 10 hours per month.  Telecom created this charge to induce ISPs to use
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enhance their own business activities.  Ihug’s growth suggests that users on average began spending
more time on the Internet.
4.4 Stage 3: 1999
The subfield of Internet access enters the main industry
Stage 3 begins in January 1999 and is still in progress at the conclusion of this study.  The major
event between January and June 1999 was a change in the price schemes offered by Xtra, which
began to offer a flat rate price below Ihug’s rate. This led to a new round of price cuts, with
ClearNet and Ihug offering prices to match that of Xtra’s. The factors which led to this event
include:
· more people connecting for longer periods, and
· Ihug improving its market share with the flat rate scheme.
The penetration of most ISPs into business data communication continues, and the number of
customers seeking Internet access continues to grow. The rate of growth has slowed, but is still
forecast to increase by around 50%23 for the year.
During this period, tariffs have switched from time-based billing to a flat rate.  This encourages most
users to increase their connection time.  The long-term effect of flat rate billing is unknown, but in the
short-term it has increased use of the Internet for both traditional and new services.  Internet
telephony and Internet fax are slowly gaining popularity in the market.  In addition, the number of
secure users on Internet sites (Extranets) has increased, and cable modems are replacing traditional
telecommunication data services.  ISPs are not yet full telecommunication service providers, but the
change seen at the beginning of this period would appear to position them as competitors in the main
telephony industry.
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
IPNet and thus remove traffic from the telephony network.
23 IDC Research Report.
40
4.5 The Effect on Consumers
All Internet users have benefited from the decrease in Internet access prices, with different types of
users enjoying price decreases at different times.  Using the price schedule for each ISP listed in
Appendix B, monthly charges for three typical users were calculated from 1996 through 1998.
Only prices for international traffic are calculated because it is assumed that most Internet traffic is
international.  This assumption is based on the fact that most sites are located in the US and non-US
users spend most of their time at US sites.  The users are defined as:
· Low-End User
Each month, uses 10 hours per month of connection time and downloads 20Mbytes of
international traffic, all at peak usage times.  As of 1998/99, this characterises a low-
end home user, although this would not have been so at the start of 1996.
· Mid-Range User
Uses 20 hours per month of connection and downloads 100Mbytes of international
traffic, 50% at peak usage.  This characterises either a heavy residential user or a small
business, with a relative increase in the former during the study period.
· High-end User
Uses 50 hours per month of connection time and downloads 500Mbytes of
international traffic, 20% at peak usage.  This characterises a business user, and the
calculations assume that extra email addresses are not as important as minimising the
monthly charge.  Many of these users have high speed dial up connections or upgraded
data connections, although this has not been assumed for price calculations.
Figure 1 below shows average prices, based on all ISPs listed in Appendix B, for 1996-1999 for
the three types of user24. Two averages are shown for 1996, the first for May 1996 when Xtra was
launched and the second for August 1996 when Xtra makes its first aggressive price move.  Results
for the major ISPs - Xtra, ClearNet, Voyager, and Ihug - are shown in Figures 2-4.
                                                                
24 These prices have not been adjusted for inflation, which has been low throughout the study period.
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Figure 1- Average of Monthly Price for All Users
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The tables in Appendix B and C list ISPs by National and Regional coverage respectively, and the
ISPs are separated by coverage area.  The nationals are ISPs that advertise their service in all major
cities: Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.  The table lists locations of points-of-presence
(POP).  The location of POPs in the table signifies coverage area for an ISP, the area in which all
customers making a connection to the ISP are not charged toll charges.  Most ISPs had limited
national coverage in 1996.  Voyager had full national coverage because users outside a POP free
call area could make use a toll free number for an additional hourly fee, which was about twice the
free call hourly rate.  Xtra did not have full national coverage but had the largest number of POPs,
meaning that a large percentage of potential users could access the service without toll charges.  In
late 1996 as Xtra’s subscriber base grew rapidly, Xtra instituted a toll free number at $1 less per
hour than the Voyager number.  This event sparked aggressive statements in the press between the
two (see Appendix A) and led to a Commerce Commission investigation.
In late 1998, Telecom introduced a service for Internet traffic in order to get this traffic off the
national network.  The prior service, New Zealand Internet Exchange (NZIX), collected all Internet
traffic on the national network and sent it through a special purpose gateway.  This new service,
IPNet, has eliminated competition between ISPs on the basis of POPs.  Any customer can now call
their ISPs via IPNet with no toll charge.  The ISPs must purchase the service from Telecom, which
seems to have not proven cost effective for smaller ISPs.25
                                                                
25 The new scheme does not appear to benefit smaller ISPs, based upon their reluctance to take up the
service:instead they pass on the Telecom charge after 10 hours per month for those customers not on IPNet.
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Figure 2- Monthly Price for Low-End User
Monthly Price for Low-End User
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Figure 3- Monthly Price for Mid-Range User
Monthly Price for Mid-Range User
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Figure 4- Monthly Price for High-End User
Monthly Price for High-End User
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For all three user types there has been a steady decline in price over the period, with the largest
decline for the high-end user.  The gap in prices between different ISPs and user  types has closed.
Also:
· Xtra entered in 1996 at a price somewhat below the average, but it was not the lowest in the
market. The subsequent decrease in the price in late 1996 was large.  From Figure 4 we can see
that Xtra made no attempt at price leadership until 1998, when Ihug’s market share began to
overtake Voyager’s.  (See Table 2)
· ClearNet entered at the end of 1996 with an entry price matching Xtra’s price.  Its price
remained stable until 1998, when it increased the price for the low end user (Figure 2) and
decreased the prices for mid-range and high-end users.
· Ihug has remained competitive for the low-end user and has maintained the low price leadership
in the mid-range and high-end user segments.
· Voyager was not price-competitive for the low-end user until 1997.  We can surmise that
Voyager lost customers because of charging a higher price than its competitors through 1996
and 1997. More recently, it has been unable to regain market share.
· The convergence of monthly charge over time (see Figures 1-4).  The convergence between
Low-End and Mid-Range Users in particular reflects the increasing variety of tariffs offered to
customers on the basis of their usage.
Evidently, all three types of Internet access customers have benefited from the lower prices in the
market. Users who use less than the “low-user” above can take advantage of the low-cost, low-
service providers. It is also clear that as the pricing schemes become less differentiated, ISPs will be
forced to compete on other factors, such as extra services or dramatic increases in transmission
speed.
Ihug has maintained the lowest price for the high-end user throughout the study period.  The figures
above show that Xtra’s prices were below its competitors for the low cost user but Ihug maintained
a lower price for the mid-range and high-end users.  Some of Voyager’s decrease in market share
may be explained by its inability to remain price-competitive in most of the user classifications during
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the study period.  The pricing scheme of Xtra complemented the marketing scheme, targeting the
novice or low end user.
4.6 Competitive Interplay
The Internet access market in New Zealand has evolved from a market supplied by small grass
roots providers to a highly competitive environment where the main telecommunications industry
providers have the top two market shares. The largest firm, Xtra, has largely been able to determine
the prevailing price for Internet access.  On entry, Xtra charged a price that was below the
prevailing market price and for some firms was less than the cost of supplying access.  The
immediate result was a decrease in the number of ISPs in New Zealand during 1997.  This strategy
has had two effects: decreasing the price the other firms had to charge to remain competitive, and
increasing demand.  Soon after entry, Xtra intensified competition by further decreasing its price and
switching to charging by time rather than transfer use.  Xtra then maintained this price and began to
focus on expanding services and attracting more business customers.  The major ISPs followed suit
and the result was a more stable period with increased product offerings.  In 1999, Xtra further
decreased the market price by introducing a flat rate scheme at a lower level than Ihug’s. The other
major ISPs matched this, whereas they had not felt it necessary to match Ihug’s pricing scheme prior
to this change. Overall, the level and variation in prices charged by the suppliers has decreased
greatly since 1996.
Xtra’s effect to the market is evident in Table 3, which shows a commanding market share six
months after launch and continued growth.  During 1997, Xtra obtained a large percentage of new
Internet users.
Table 3 - Number of Subscribers26
Pre-5/96 1/97 6/97 1/9827 6/98 1/99 5/99
Xtra28 0 16,000 51,000 80,000 133,000 150,000 200,000
                                                                
26 These subscriber figures are from published articles from the Reuters’ News Feed.
27 IDC Research study claims 214,200 Internet accounts for 12/97.
28 Xtra counts subscribers as number of people who have signed up, less number of people who have cancelled.
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Voyager 10,000 14,580 20,000 23,000 24,000 28,000 A
ClearNet B B 15,000 35,000 55,000 70,000 90,000
The Internet
Group (Ihug)
A A A 30,000 45,000 60,000 80,000
CompuServe 7000 8400 7000 A A A A
A Unable to obtain figures for number of subscribers for these times from Reuters’ News Feed.
B Not in operation until 11/96, no accurate figures by 1/97
Xtra has made competition difficult for some of the other ISP’s and this has led to complaints to the
Commerce Commission, the administrator of the Commerce Act 1986. The Commerce Act 1986 is
relevant to Xtra as a business unit of Telecom New Zealand.  The Act sets out conduct that inhibits
efficient economic mechanisms and prevents competition.  Grievances are usually brought before the
Commerce Commission.  Sections 36 and 36A of the Commerce Act are intended to prohibit
misuse of market power.  The test generally applied is the ability to dominate a particular market,
not solely that of providing great influence.29 The Commerce Commission has ruled that Xtra is not
considered a dominant player in this market since entry barriers are very low and Telecom is not the
only provider of Internet access, local access or data communication services.
Xtra maintains that the wholesale bandwidth price it enjoys is due to its bulk purchasing.  It has also
been funded heavily by Telecom and continued to sustain significant operating losses through 1998.
Telecom spent NZ$9 million to start Xtra30 and initially predicted Xtra would be operating at a profit
within one year.  Towards the end of 1998, Xtra was still not profitable and CEO Roderick Deane
stated Xtra will be profitable by 200031 – four years after initial launch.
Each of the ISPs discussed has created a strategy for entry into the New Zealand Internet access
market.  Each firm decided whether to enter the market and how much to invest in the entry effort.
This initial strategic decision determined the resources an ISP had on market entry and greatly
influenced their reactions to competition.  Telecom New Zealand decided to enter the Internet
access market in 1996, after the initial establishment of demand for access services.  Telecom
                                                                
29 Watson et al. Chapter 24
30 Figures quoted from several newspaper articles at the time of Xtra’s launch.
31 CEO statement in 1998 Telecom Financial Statement.
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entered the market late relative to the market pioneers Ihug, Voyager, and NetLink but earlier than
the second telecommunications service provider, Clear Communications.  Telecom’s strategy for
Xtra was to grow market share and grow demand for Internet access services.  In support of this
strategy Telecom placed few expenditure restrictions on Xtra.  Telecom New Zealand announced
that it spent $9 million in direct investment on the launch but total figures have not been made public.
Through Xtra services offerings in IP telephony, leased lines and ISDN, Telecom has demonstrated
its willingness to allow Xtra to utilise its telecommunications services in order to grow and maintain
its market share.  Other “agents”, including ISPs, had access to these services as well, either for
their own use or for resale.
In contrast, Clear Communications’ subsidiary entrant ClearNet may well have been on a restrictive
budget for their product launch, even though the owners of Clear, MCI and later British Telecom,
have had vastly more resources than Telecom New Zealand. However these international
companies have their investment spread across a wide range of markets.  British Telecom (BT) is
the majority owner of Clear Communications and views Clear as the New Zealand member of its
international network, and one of many global profit centres.  It may be that Clear had restricted
financial backing for its development of Internet services.  If so, this would have influenced Clear
Communications’ strategy of entering the Internet access market in order to offer additional services
to existing customers.  Clear has developed this strategy to best use their other resources: customer
loyalty, customer service, and strong presence in Auckland.  Clear’s goals seem to be motivated by
retaining customers for multiple services rather than growing market share in individual markets.
Xtra’s strategy since its launch has been to grow market share with the view that holding the
majority of subscriber accounts will lead to long-term profitability.  ClearNet’s strategy is to maintain
customer relationships, and offering Internet access is another service to provide to its customer
base32.  Clear’s passive strategy towards the major competitors in the Internet market is due in part
to restricted financial resources and in part to a determined strategy to retain the number two
position in the telecommunications market.  Other internationally owned companies such as IBM,
CompuServe and Microsoft entered early when there was little competition.  Their initial strategy
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was to use resources developed in the US to compete in the New Zealand market.  As more firms
entered the market, these resources ceased to provide a competitive advantage and their structure,
with most resources located in the US, became a disadvantage.
The most successful small ISP has been Ihug.  Ihug’s strategy has been typical of a new firm, starting
with few resources and growing the business primarily on the entrepreneurial skills of the owners.
Typical of a start-up firm, Ihug has concentrated on keeping costs low and maintaining cash flow.
There has been no apparent strategy to grow market share but rather there has been an effort to
maintain the appropriate number of subscribers to minimise the marginal cost of investing in
additional bandwidth.  Ihug has focused on residential customers and small businesses.
In contrast, Voyager’s strategy has been greatly influenced by OzEmail’s financial resources.
OzEmail has invested heavily in technological innovations that have paid off in captured market share
in Australia, placing them in second position.  Voyager was OzEmail’s entry into the New Zealand
market in 1995.  As a market pioneer, it quickly captured market share.  However, throughout the
study period, Voyager seems to have been unwilling to decrease price in order to remain
competitive. Voyager has concentrated on the competitive residential market, and seemingly any
expenses or infrastructure improvements must be covered by income.  This is similar to Ihug’s
financial situation, but Ihug has steadily increased its market while Voyager has lost market share.  It
is apparent that Ihug, through risky and innovative acquisition of bandwidth capacity, has been able
to achieve a lower cost structure and thus remain competitive on price.   Voyager has not remained
competitive on price, perhaps reflecting its cost structure.
NetLink, a smaller player, has maintained profitability but developed a different strategic direction.
NetLink was started as a residential service through Victoria University of Wellington in 1995.
Though NetLink, through its relationship with the University, had more resources than other New
Zealand start-up ISPs, its primary motivation was not profit but to provide access to constituents.
As the residential access market became more competitive through the 1996/1997 periods, NetLink
began a shift to build credibility with business customers.  Currently NetLink has mostly business
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
32 Both Telecom’s and Clear’s strategies are in accord with an overall strategy of retaining their
telecommunications customer bases.  The extensive customer base of Telecom meant that it would have to target
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subscribers, who are few in number relative to the total market, but more profitable due to the value
added services Netlink provides.
The smaller group of ISPs (IproLink, Actrix, ICONZ and newly formed Paradise.net) has
concentrated their resources on retaining customer relationships in specific population centres and
maintaining a positive cash flow.  Their long-term strategy appears to be survival rather than
expansion.
Xtra’s strategy throughout the period has been to grow the market and its market share.  Xtra has
had access to financial, human, physical and organisational resources of Telecom through their
relationship.  Xtra has been successful in accomplishing strategic goals and has achieved a
competitive advantage by leveraging off resources shared with Telecom New Zealand.  In addition
to heavy financial investment, Telecom provided Xtra access to the physical network for trials and
tests, and limited use of new technology for testing purposes for short periods prior to its availability
other ISPs.  Xtra was also able to utilise Telecom’s expertise in billing software, call centre
operation and project management.  Though the value provided by Telecom in human and
organisational resources may have contributed less than other resources in achieving strategic aims,
these advantages have nonetheless made a valuable contribution. Other ISPs have had the same
access to physical resources, but communication about network use and configuration would have
been easier for Xtra.
Evidence of advantage from organisational resources can also be observed through a top view of
Telecom New Zealand’s organisational chart and how other ISPs received service through the
structure.  The organisational chart is shown in Figure 5.  The figure demonstrates lines of reporting
to the CEO.  Xtra reported directly to the CEO as a separate business unit within the Enterprise and
Directory Group.  All requests were negotiated through the CEO and the Networks Group as
necessary.  Clear and Telstra, however, negotiated with Networks Group for services but as
external entities.  This created a layer of decision-making between Clear or Telstra and Telecom
New Zealand that Xtra did not have.  The other ISPs; such as Voyager, Ihug and Actrix, discussed
services with an account manager which in turn were discussed with the Services Group manager
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
all sorts of customers to be successful in the wider strategy.
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and to the CEO as necessary.  These ISPs faced an additional layer of decision-making, which
slowed service requests, communication and implementation.  This provided an additional advantage
for Xtra as it is closest to the decision-making and implementation process.  ClearNet would have
similar advantages within Clear Communication’s network.  However, top level decision making
would have been heavily influenced by the parent company.
Figure 5 - Telecom’s Structural ISP Interface
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Xtra
Resources available to individual ISPs influence the components of business strategy.  The decision
of how much to spend on advertising and which types of advertising to purchase are directly
affected by financial resources available to the ISP.  Figure 6 shows the total of advertising
expenditure for Xtra, ClearNet, Ihug, and Voyager for 1996 through the third quarter of 1999.
Each ISP’s percentage contribution to the total is also shown.  The total advertising expense
increased substantially between 1996 and 1997 and then more modestly in subsequent years.  This
initial jump corresponds to increased competition for subscribers.  In an effort to gain consumer
recognition, Xtra has spent at least 50% of the total expenditure of the top four ISPs in each year.
The precise causality between advertising and number of subscribers is unknown but advertising is
one possible contribution to Xtra’s rapid increase in number of subscribers.
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Figure 6 – Advertising Expenditure of the Four Major ISPs
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Voyager spent around 50% of the total expenditure in 1996.  As the absolute money spent on
advertising between these four ISPs jumped in 1997, Voyager’s percentage amount decreased
dramatically presumably due to its inability to maintain a large expenditure on advertising.  Ihug
substantially increased its advertising expenditure in 1999.
Part of the reason for the large differences in total advertising between the four major ISPs can be
explained in Table 4, which lists the percentage of each ISP’s budget spent on TV/Radio versus
Print.  Most of the advertising in the TV/Radio category was for television advertisements.  Few
ISPs used radio spots.  Print combines both newspapers and magazines.  TV advertising is more
costly than print, but reaches a more diverse audience.  Quarterly data were aggregated into annual
totals to avoid fluctuations caused by a contract figure reported in a single quarter, yet covering
more than that quarter’s advertising.
Table 4 – Advertising Budget Percentage Devoted TV versus Print
TV/Radio Print TV/Radio Print TV/Radio Print TV/Radio Print
1996 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1997 56.0% 44.0% 60.8% 39.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1998 17.6% 82.4% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1999 75.9% 24.1% 0.0% 100.0% 73.1% 26.9% 0.0% 100.0%
Xtra ClearNet Ihug Voyager
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Most of the ISPs spent some money on print advertising, with Ihug, ClearNet, and Voyager
favouring print over TV.  Most of the large advertising expenditure corresponds to a single event.
Xtra spent substantial money on TV in 1997, when prices were dropped, and again in 1999, when
the flat rate was introduced.  ClearNet has spent significantly less on advertising and yet maintained
their number two spot in terms of numbers of subscribers.  This relates to the strategy to focus on
current Clear Communications customers, spending advertising dollars on direct marketing efforts
rather than on a push to reach new customers.  Xtra has maintained its percentage of advertising
expenditure even though absolute amounts have risen.  This fits with the strategy of maintaining
leadership in number of subscribers.  Ihug has increased expenditure at the same time as the firm has
become more aggressive in the New Zealand market.
The Internet access market is considered to be a subfield on the larger telecommunications market,
and the top four firms in the Internet market now include two firms that have entered from the larger
market, and two firms that entered directly into the subfield. It is reasonable to assume that the
telecommunications providers are motivated, in part, by a desire to diversify their service offerings.
For example, in Telecom’s 1999 Annual report, the CEO, Roderick Deane, describes the role of
Internet in its overall strategy:
“The continuing development of Internet–based online technologies and services has created
demand for access to very high capacity (broadband) networks.  Telecom’s broadband
strategy aims to open opportunities to create and sell innovative services and products to meet
this demand and lead the New Zealand economy online.  Telecom is committed to an online
future.  This commitment will have substantial effects on Telecom’s networks, the services that
Telecom sells and on interactions between Telecom, its suppliers and its customers…”
5.0 Strategy, Entry and Resources
This section of the paper considers the development of the Internet market in terms of the strategy
literature discussed in Section 2. In particular, recall that the resources-based analysis in business
strategy literature focuses on the unique resources possessed by each firm within an industry and
how each collection of resources within the industry leads to success of some firms over others.  In
Barney's 1996 paper, resources are classified specifically as being valuable, rare, non-imitable and
supportive through the organisation.  He postulates that these qualities of an individual firm’s
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resources may lead to a competitive advantage in the marketplace. The resources of the major ISPs
at the time Xtra’s entry and in Stages two and three are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 - Resources of ISP Competitors
At time of Xtra’s Entry Stage 2 Stage 3
Xtra •   Large financial resources evident from
financial statements
•   Managementresources in
telecommunications
•   Parent Telecom network coverage almost
100% of households and businesses
(available to ISPs)
•   Certain communication advantage from
complementary with Telecom
•   Billing processes available from
telecommunications part of business
No change in
resources
•   Increase in
accessible
physical
resources due to
establishment of
IPNet
•   Continuing
decrease in cost
structure
ClearNet •   Possible limited financial resources due to
decision of parent firms
•   3 years experience in telecommunication
industry gives some management
expertise
•   Clear’s physical resources include a fibre
optic network connecting CBDs for data
communication low percentage of direct
access outside Auckland (available to
ISPs)
•   Call centre and billing processes available
from telecommunications part of
business
•   No change is
resources
•   Possible reasons for
continuing success
Ö Strong customer
loyalty
Ö Strong customer
presence in
Auckland
Ö Customer service
skill
•   Little change
•   Increase in
accessible
physical
resources due to
establishment of
IPNet
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Table 5 – continued
At time of Xtra’s Entry Stage 2 Stage 3
Voyager •   Minimal capital available from parent
company, used for investing in new
technology
•   Survival skills gained by management due
to growth in market share and successes
in Australia
•   Very little physical capital available with 5
POPs in New Zealand
•   Minimal organisational resources
    available due to new organisation and
 rapid growth in market share.
No change in
resources, cost
structure continuing
disadvantage
•   Little change
•   Increase in
accessible
physical resources
due to
establishment of
IPNet
Ihug •   Minimal financial capital, working to
maintain status in market and expand into
Australia
•   Little management experience but
entrepreneurial spirit
•   Physical resources consist of several
POPs in New Zealand (comparable with
Voyager) but real advantage is
contracted bandwidth external from
Telecom allowing a more competitive
price structure (ie SITA)
•   New organisation with little developed
business process and organisational
support systems
•   Improved financial
capital due to
profitable business
in Auckland and
Sydney
•   Continue to improve
access with
contracted
bandwidth
•   Cheap source of
bandwidth
becomes
sustainable
resource
•   Capital infusion by
SkyTV share
purchase33
•   Management gains
sufficient expertise
to become
resource
•   Increase in
accessible
physical resource
due to
establishment of
IPNet
                                                                
33 SkyTV backed out of the agreement in 1999.
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Table 5 – continued
At time of Xtra’s Entry Stage 2 Stage 3
IBM/
Compu-
Serve
•   Large potential financial capital from
parent company
•   Extensive management experience of
parent companies
•   No physical capital within New Zealand,
all holdings in international networks
•   Extensive business processes experience
available from parent companies
•   No change in
resources
•   Lack of physical
resources prevents
innovative
bandwidth
acquisition and
thus competitive
price schemes
Left market for all
practical purposes
Major
Regionals
•   Minimal financial resources
•   Minimal management resources (varies
extensively between ISPs)
•   Minimal physical resources
•   Minimal business processes but some
success of survivors
Continue to improve
physical resources via
investment in services
•   Improvement in
management
resources allows
them to make
better use of their
limited resources.
•   Increase in
accessible
physical resources
due to
establishment of
IPNet
More specifically, the decision of a firm to enter into a subfield requires the firm to match its
resources with the ingredients needed to compete within that subfield.  The literature discussing entry
into a subfield of a mature industry is applicable here: the Internet access subfield was created from
the relatively mature telecommunications industry. But the development of a new subfield does not
necessarily provide incumbents in the mature industry with a competitive advantage.  The resources
of the incumbent must be applicable to the new subfield.  Mitchell (1991) postulated that the
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incumbent may enter the subfield later in the subfield lifecycle than other less resource rich entrants
without loss of competitive opportunities.
This has clearly been the case for the telecommunication service providers in the New Zealand
Internet market.   What has created their competitive advantage over other Internet access
providers? Telecom and Clear both possess some form of local access through their investments in
telecommunication infrastructure.  Both also possess a large capacity of cheap international
telecommunications traffic through multinational inter-connection agreements.  Xtra has been more
successful than ClearNet in growing market share largely due to Telecom’s substantial financial
support for Xtra that allowed more flexibility in determining price strategies.  Ihug’s number three
spot in terms of market share is primarily due to local and international capacity from sources
outside the other access providers, that allow a lower cost structure and thus maintain flat rate
pricing.  Most of the smaller ISPs use Telecom’s IPNet and its predecessor NZIX34.
Xtra’s probability of success in the subfield was increased by the low cost structure derived from the
physical network holdings of the parent company: the ability to provide a single bill for telephony,
data communications and Internet access services, the parent company’s well defined business
processes and lengthy experience in managing call centres, and more generally, the financial and
management resources available to it.  Telecom’s financial resources have allowed Xtra to set price
structures and provide services that have made a loss for the division.  It has a competitive
advantage in the subfield that supports its continued large market share.
This can be seen as part of a wider strategy for Telecom, in which it seeks to maintain its position in
the telecommunications industry, including any potentially profitable subfields that arise. Xtra’s
strategy has been to modify its data communication products when it becomes clear that new
Internet technology promotes other ways of providing services.  For example, Xtra introduced
Internet telephony when its competitors did, but withdrew the product after ordinary telephony
customers did not switch to this new product en masse35.  It is apparent that Telecom will introduce
new services through Xtra as a substitute for current products in order to retain overall market share
                                                                
34 NZIX – New Zealand Internet Exchange.  This is an international gateway available to all Internet service
providers, which is separate from 
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and thereby profitability.  Telecom’s operating revenue streams also demonstrate the changes for the
last 10 years, shown in Table 6.  While local calling revenue has declined from 40% to 30% of
operating revenue and toll calls have declined from 30% to 16% of operating revenue, these
declines have largely been made up by revenue from mobile and data services.  As we track the
revenue from mobile services, we see an increase over the period from 3% to 14% of operating
revenue.  Unfortunately, Internet and data communications figures cannot be accurately tracked
because Telecom changed the definition of these services three times during the period.  We can
track enhanced network services until one year after Xtra’s launch (1997) and find at least a 10% of
operating revenue due to these services.
Table 6: Telecom Operating Revenue Streams 1989-1999-08-25
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Operating Revenue
(millions) 2158 2292 2431.8 2568 2474.3 2497 2691.9 2924.7 3083 3398 3434
Rev:Local Calls 37.5% 36.0% 34.7% 32.7% 33.9% 34.2% 32.4% 30.4% 29.6% 30.2% 30.8%
Rev:Nat Calls* 29.4% 22.5% 22.3% 21.4% 18.9% 18.1% 18.4% 18.8% 18.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Rev: Intnl Calls 17.2% 19.5% 20.4% 19.8% 19.0% 18.3% 17.9% 16.8% 16.7% 15.4% 13.7%
Rev: Other 15.9% 22.0% 22.6% 26.1% 28.1% 29.5% 31.3% 34.0% 36.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Other/Cellular 2.6% 3.8% 4.6% 5.8% 7.0% 8.5% 10.7% 10.3% 12.5% 14.0%
Other/Directories 2.4% 3.6% 4.8% 3.6% 4.0% 4.0% 4.1% 4.4% 4.3% 4.6%
Other/Leased 5.9% 5.7% 5.8% 5.3% 5.1% 4.9% 4.6% 4.5%
Other/Enhan Ntwk 0.7% 1.5% 3.5% 4.3% 6.2% 7.8% 10.4%
Other/Misc 2.8% 3.6% 4.9% 4.2% 3.3% 2.6% 3.1% 3.4% 3.3%
Rev: Local Service 31.1% 30.2% 30.8%
Rev: Calling 38.1% 36.9% 34.0%
Revenue:
Interconnection 2.1% 2.1% 2.5%
Revenue: Cellular
and other mobile 10.2% 12.5% 14.0%
Rev: Data 8.3% 8.7% 9.8%
Revenue: Other
operating revenue 10.1% 9.7% 8.9%
*Revenue from National toll calls was discontinued as a category in the 1998 annual report and split between
Calling Revenue and other revenues.
Xtra and ClearNet have similar resources developed through their telecommunications business.
ClearNet entered the market six months after Xtra and its market share has increased at a slower
rate than Xtra’s.  It has moved to second place in market share, but its non-aggressive strategy as a
price follower signals ClearNet’s willingness to remain in the second spot.  The history of events
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
35 Consumers did not accept a lower quality of service for greatly reduced prices.
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shown in Appendix A demonstrates that Clear Communication’s strategy has been to follow
Telecom’s actions and maintain parity to the greatest extent possible in price and service offerings.
For example, Telecom announced it would offer an ISP service in early 1996.  Clear
Communications also announced a service in August 1996, three months after observing Xtra’s
early entrance results.  Clear decided it was necessary to offer a similar service rather than allow
their customers to sign up with Xtra.
Over time, the market pioneers have not done as well as the later entrants.  The Absolute Pioneer
Theory would predict that companies such as Actrix, Ihug, Voyager, ICONZ and some regionals
should be the market leaders.  This advantage should come from smaller firms quickly changing
service offerings to meet ill-defined customer demand and vague preferences.  In fact, the later
entrants have done well due to apply significant resources targeted on clearly defined customer
preferences.
The primary reasons for the non-applicability of Absolute Pioneer Theory are:
· The pioneers were unable to create a differentiability of their products through branding or
reputation.  Consumers wanted the lowest price for their access time.
· The pioneers were unable to create a switching cost barrier.  The later entrants picked up
both new customers and switching customers due to the practically non-existent switching
costs in this subfield.
Ihug continues to remain competitive as the only firm without the resources of a telecommunications
company.  It has been able to do this with a niche strategy, and has benefited from a growth in their
target niche. It looked for innovative ways to cut costs by developing a distribution system outside of
Telecom’s services.  International bandwidth is the raw material for providing Internet access and
Ihug purchased satellite time without knowing whether it would fill the capacity.  That gamble, along
with some technology gambles, such as using local radio transmission and substantial investments in
international traffic access, created a beneficial cost structure for Ihug.  It also began offering a flat
rate service in 1996 when competitors were charging by time and/or traffic.  As shown in Figure 4,
the flat rate service greatly benefit high-end users.  Ihug’s market share has grown from a negligible
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share to 16% of the market, largely due to the growth of Internet users in that niche.  Xtra and
ClearNet ignored these users until 1999, when Xtra announced a flat rate scheme and ClearNet
matched.
When reviewing the events of the Internet access market in New Zealand, we can classify the entry
strategy by the set of resources a firm possesses and the timing of market entry.  A firm with limited
resources that selects early entry can be classified as a Market Pioneer.  This firm is entering when
the lack of resources does not pose a disadvantage.  In the case of Internet access in New Zealand,
the market pioneers would be Ihug, Voyager, Actrix, NetLink, ICONZ and IproLink.  A late
entrant into a new market with limited resources would be classified as a Nicher.  This firm uses its
limited resources to meet the demands of a small segment of customers whose needs are not well
met by the large firm(s).  Examples in the New Zealand market are firms such as Paradise.Net who
offer a low price, but with limited customer support services.  In order to achieve market success,
Ihug has changed its strategy from Market Pioneer to Nicher.  Ihug is an example of how a survivor
of early entry can change its strategy in order to succeed with continuing resource limitations relative
to late entry competitors.
The firms with a larger set of applicable resources either enter the market early or late. The early
entrant - the Creator firm - is investing money in technology or market research in order to find a
new source of demand, such as a new subfield.  This firm has the extra financial resources and
management skills in the main industry to create a new subfield. The New Zealand Internet access
market has no example of such a firm (but a classic example is 3M with its Post-it Notes36).  The
firm with a large set of applicable resources and a strategy of late entry, relative to Market Pioneers,
is labelled a Clock-Watcher, after the concept of a dual clock.  From Mitchell’s work, this firm
would enter a new market or subfield later and expect to receive substantial market share.  Xtra and
ClearNet are examples of Clock-Watchers.
The dual clock theory can only be fully tested in a market with two equal incumbents entering at the
same time.  Mitchell (1991) tested his theory in the US medical imaging industry with the staggered
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entry of incumbents to a new subfield.  He showed empirically that (1) incumbents could enter later
and have strong success and (2) timing between incumbents determined long-term success in the
new subfield.  Mitchell also postulates that a dual clock most likely exists in industries with
specialised assets such as manufacturing or distribution since they are costly to replicate.  This is
applicable to the New Zealand Internet access market since a key advantage of telecommunications
firms is the ability to distribute the service locally and possession of a national network.  Entrants that
achieve a lower cost structure succeed.
The strategy literature suggests that a decision regarding early or later entry will based upon the
resources available at the time of entry.  For example, if an incumbent firm within the main industry
felt it could take the Creator position and gain a majority market share in the subfield, the use of
resources in the subfield development would be justified.  On the other hand, an incumbent firm in
the main industry could enter later, when more information about the new subfield is known, and still
gain superior performance.  In summary, a company can match its applicable resources, evaluate
them with respect to competitors, and select an appropriate strategy based on the timing of its
entrance into the new market.  This study offers support for the resource-based entry-affecting
strategy; although it demonstrates that innovative pioneers that develop a comparative advantge can
also succeed.
6.0 Final Comment
This study has provided a short economic history of the Internet access market in New Zealand. To
date it has been a subfield of the telecommunications industry.  The subfield has evolved from Stage
0 when most of the users were hobbyists and academics to Stage 1 where the providers became
profit maximising firms, through to Stage 2 where most ISPs offered traditional telecommunication
services.  This study concludes in mid 1999 at the start of Stage 3 where the incumbents are
aggressively seeking to maintain their relative position in the subfield.
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
36 A 3M employee discovered how to make temporary adhesive note pads to keep notes in his Bible.  3M used
this discovery to create an entirely new product which later spawned a new subfield within the office products
industry.
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This study observes two generalisations from the New Zealand Internet access market.  First,
resources that a firm possesses and the timing of their entry are more important than entering the
market first.  The incumbents entered the Internet market much later but with superior resources that
allowed them to capture substantial market share and create a sustainable competitive advantage.
The concept of an absolute advantage held by pioneers is not applicable if the cost to consumers of
switching is low, and if sunk costs are low or one or more of the potential competitors are prepared
to commit substantial financial resources.  In addition, later entry may be facilitated by ready
organisation of complementary resources.  The concept that a strategic window or relatively short
period exists between clocks is not applicable in these circumstances unless the entrant achieves and
maintains a lower cost structure. These conclusions may be more generally applicable to other
Internet markets globally, and may help companies predict successful strategies in markets with a
dominant competitor.  The question of how long an incumbent can wait remains unanswered in this
study.
The economic history of the New Zealand IP market reveals rapid growth in customer uptake,
steeply falling prices and prices that have converged across suppliers. These results are not
surprising given the low barriers to entry and the increasing range of value-added products that are
obtainable on the internet.
An economic evaluation of this should take into account the classic network externality: that extra
persons with Internet access implies the existence of benefits to other consumers who may want to
exchange information with them. In fact, although this externality is likely to exist, it may not be as
strong as it was in the history of telephony because of the reasonably close-substitute ways in which
consumers can exchange information without Internet access.  Importantly, any economic evaluation
should also take account of the drivers of lower prices and internet penetration in the population. In
this respect the motivations and actions of the telecommunications companies may have a very
important influence on the economic performance of the market. For example, if Xtra’s aggressive
pricing and broad based promotion induced penetration in the population to expand over what it
would have been otherwise, and Xtra goes on to at least break even (where its costs include its
market investment costs), then these actions will have very likely improved the dynamic efficiency of
the economy. This would be the case for any of the ISPs that by their own actions induced an
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expansion in the market as a whole, and for whom the investment was recovered.  It is likely to be
the case for market pioneers.
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Appendices
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Appendix A – Summary of Major Events in ISP market 1996-1998 – Major ISPs
Name Apr-96 May-96 Jun-96 Jul-96 Aug-96 Sep-96 Oct-96 Nov-96 Dec-96 Jan-97 Feb-97
Actrix Offers ISDN service Looking for roaming partner.
Lanuches national 
service: 
$1.08/hr>$2.50/hr
CompuServe
Splits ISP from 
Information service
Has global roaming service.
ClearNet
Announces offering ISP 
service
Launches service: 
$2.95/hr day, $2.50/hr 
peak, $2.25/hr of f-peak,
$5.95/hr 0800, Accuses 
Xtra of anti-competitive 
behaviour over bundling
practice.
IBM Gl obal Network Halves prices
Has global roaming 
service.
Internet Company of 
NZ
The Internet Group 
Ltd (Ihug)
$40/mo flat fee
No plans to launch global 
roaming service.
Internet ProLink NZ
NetLi nk Of fer VPN service
Voyager NZ Ltd
$4.95/hr peak 
$3.95/hr off-peak, 
$6.95/hr 0800, 
Claims it will 
increase f rom 6 to 
19 POPs
(1) Several ISPs meet  to 
discuss Xtra pricing plan.  (2) 
Threatens to withdraw 0800 
service
Fingering/Spamming 
incident takes place, 
registers complaint 
with Commerce 
Commission
1. Accuses Xtra of Exit 
promoting strategy 2. 
Expected to launch global 
roaming service.
Of fers fax to fax 
service.
Launches 
Internet 
telephony
Xtra
Launches service: 
$9.98/hr>$6.95 
$7.49/hr>$6.95 
$4.99/hr>$.95
Switches to hourly rate: 
$2.50/hr $4.95/hr 0800
(1)Telecom drops $400 ISDN 
connection fee (2) Telecom 
blocks Voyager f rom Xtra 
(restored within a week) 3. 
Lots of problems in delivering 
service.
Invites Voyager to take 
part  in IPNet trial.
Trials Internet 
telephony
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Name Mar-97 Apr-97 May-97 Jun-97 Jul-97 Aug-97 Sep-97 Oct-97 Nov-97 Dec-97 Jan-98
Actrix
CompuServe
$8.50>$5.50, 
$3.95>$5.50, 
$2.80>$5.50
ClearNet
Begin major 
market ing 
campaign, offers 
ISDN for 
$7.50/hr
1. Advert ising focuses on business 
customers,  offers VPN service. 2. 
Launches Clear Net  Commercial to 
invite business customers.
Introduces iPass 
service, make local 
call to ISP in 150 
countries.
IBM Global Network
Internet Company of 
NZ $2/hr to $1.10/hr
The Internet Group 
Ltd (Ihug)
Launches 
competitor to 
Telecom's FR 
network at great  
cost savings by 
leasing BW on 
satellite.
Launches Sydney 
service
85% of internat ional 
traffic goes through 
satellite link via Sky 
Tower. 2. Sells 
microwave bandwidth 
via SkyTower. $1.125/hr
Internet ProLink NZ
Offers 56.6Kbps Offers VPN service over Internet
NetLink
Offers radio based VPN service.
Voyager NZ Ltd
1. $1.66/hr>$2.49, 
$5.99 0800,  $4.89/hr 
0800prepaid,  $2.99/hr 
2. Accuses Xtra of 
differential 0800 
charging. Ozemail buys 
remaining 20%
Xtra
FCC Complaint  lodged 
against them.
Launches 
Internet  
telephony
Commerce 
Commission 
rules in favour of 
Xtra.
Telecom lists 
investment  in Xtra at 
approx. $100m.
Changes name to Telecom Xtra, 
slashes ISDN prices, refocuses on 
bus cust . Offers data service 
cheaper than Netway.  2. Launches 
Business Network to offer e-
commerce services.
$1.75/hr>$2.50/
hr,  $4.95/hr 
0800
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Name Feb-98 Mar-98 Apr-98 May-98 Jun-98 Jul-98 Aug-98 Sep-98 Oct-98
Actrix
Not fully upgraded 
to 56kbps
1. Spends $100,000 for 3D e-
commerce server for web based 
shopping mall. 2. Signs on for 
IPNet and begins national 
service.
CompuServe
ClearNet
Purchases LMDS 
frequency
Unveils new packages for 
business customers. Claims 
66,000 subscribers
IBM Global Network
Internet Company of 
NZ
To offer 56kbps in 
CBDs only.
Claims NZ Post and ASB Bank 
are customers.
The Internet Group 
Ltd (Ihug)
Launches StarNet,
steps up data 
services ads.
Plans fast data service using 
satellite connections
Internet ProLink NZ
NetLink
Launches VPN Service via 
Internet.
Launches 
Internet 
telephony
Starts VPN over Internet 
service.
Launches Internet phone service
"iPhone" in Wellington, Auckland, 
Christchurch
Voyager NZ Ltd
Cuts 0800 to 
$3.36, Relaunches
Internet telephony 
1. Launches VPN Service via 
Internet. 2. Claims it made 
operating profit, has 24,000 
customers, 800 corporate 
clients, expect to expand in 
1998. Has migrated to IPNet. $1.25>$2.50
Offers NetGain, prepaid plans 
from $1.25/hr to $2.50/hr.
Xtra
Cuts 0800 to 
$2.50 IPNet 
online
Launches "Business Builder", 
ISDN serv ice @ $7.50/hr, 
Internet roaming service. 
Releases voice over Internet 
RFP.
1. Subscribers 
later reported at 
124,100 2. Launch
$45/mo for 50hrs. Launches VPN Service
(1) Suspends Internet telephony 
(2) Deane quoted as Telecom's 
future is the Internet (3) 
Subscribers reported at 133,000
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Name Nov-98 Dec-98 Jan-99 Feb-99 Mar-99 Apr-99
Actrix
Using IPNet
1. Reorganises management 
structure in order to expand 
business. 2. Hal King purchases 
company outright.
CompuServe
ClearNet
IBM Global Network
Internet Company of 
NZ
The Internet Group 
Ltd (Ihug)
1. Claims 60,000 subscribers in NZ, 
20,000 in Oz.  StarNet TV service 
installation listed at NZ$3,000. Current rate 
in Oz at 400kbps. ISDN Internet service 
A$868 installation, A$59/mo flat rate. 
POPs Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne. 2. 
Commerce Commission unofficially 
investigating Ihug f lat rate because it  has a 
3 hr max in peak times for continous use.
Has 40 ISP customers in Australia.  Expected to resell PanAm 
Sat bandwidth to Korea and Taiwan. Not using IPNet due to 
unreliability.
To spend $7.5 mil on 
private long distance 
toll calls network.
Internet ProLi nk NZ
Not using IPNet.
NetLink Sets up eftpos transactions on its hosted sites, NetPOS.  Cost is
$325 to setup and $100/month.  Transaction fees applies for 
large transaction traffic.
Voyager NZ Ltd
Launches e-commerce 
service.  Design cost will 
be $35,000-$40,000.
1. Hosts ASB's e-commerce site. 2. Has 
15 POPs.
Xtra
(1) Telecom floats 
charging local dialup data 
service access. (2) 
$2.96/hr 3. Xtra still los ing 
money.
1. Telecom admits Xtra still losing $. 
Subscribers are now to 159,600. Launches
web mall site. 2. Hackers infiltrate Xtra but 
subscribers must pay $150 to trace bad 
charges. 3. 5000 customers were left 
without email from 27/11 to 28/11 due to 
error in upgrade. Web site hosting drops 
from $100 to $25/mo.
Launches CommerceBuilder, an e-commerce trading platform 
for businesses wanting transactions on the site.
1. Telecom charges $0.10/hr for 
IPNet connecti ons. 2. 
CommerceBui lder allowed to use
128bit encryption by US Dept of 
Commerce. 3. Init ial  package is 
$600/store and $3/invoice over 
$100, mi nimum $100/mo.  EDI 
services avai lable.
Telecom will offer 
ADSL service to all 
ISPs on IPNet from 
April. Subscribers are 
now to 160,000.
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Name May-99 Jun-99 Jul-99 Aug-99 Sep-99
Actrix
Auckland Internet 
Exchange
CompuServe
ClearNet
1. Moving to a flat rate in June but price not disc losed. 
Expects to spend $2mil on upgrading the network to 
meet demand. 2. Clear adds modems and bandwidth 
and access points in Christchurch.  Currently has 90,000 
Customers.  
Introduces flat rate $39.95 charge in response to Xtra 
and Ihugs new flat rate charge.
Globe.net
IBM Global 
Network
Internet Company of 
NZ
The Internet Group 
Ltd (Ihug)
1. Sky TV planning to purchase 30% stake in ISP with an 
option to increase stake to 45%.  Price estimates for 
stake is $30 to $35 million.  Claims 75,000 Internet 
accounts. Ihug claims Sky has complementary 
technology, Sky claims Ihug a good investment with 
possible future synergy.  2. Claims 80,000 subscribers.  
Claims 60% of customers on flat rate. Doubled the time 
of its $30 Sapphire account.
Flat rate fee reduced from $45 to $39.50 in response to 
Xtra price announcement
Sky pulls out of deal to 
buy 30% stake due to 
Ihug plan to offer 
competing cable service.
Internet ProLink NZ
NetLi nk
Paradise.Net Offers free Internet access through Saturn.
Qui k
Introduces flat rate service for $39.95/month.
Voyager NZ Ltd
Xtra 1. Rumours that Xtra may be floated. 2. Introduces new 
flate rate for $39.95 undercutting Ihug's  $45 flat fee. 3. 
Claims 200,000 customers
Has first profitable month.  Has 200,000 
subscribers, 40-50% of the market
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Appendix B: List of Internet Service Providers in New Zealand – National
Name Location 1996
Set up Fee 
1996
On-going Charges 
1996
Connect Charges 1996
Customer 
Service 1996
Products 1996
Actrix Nationwide $30
$168/yr switches to 
$65/mo for 60hrs 12/96
Int'l: $3/Mb, Nat'l: 
$0.50/Mb
Help, desk, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, web 
page hosting
CompuServe Nationwide None
(a) $17/mo for 2hrs 
Powerusers: $39.50/mo 
for 5hrs
(a) $9.90/hr 
Powerusers: $13/hr 
peak, $0.60/hr off-peak, 
no data volume charges
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
magazine, downloadable 
software and news 
service, web page 
hosting
ClearNet Nationwide $34.95 None
$2.95/hr 7am-4pm, 
$2.50/hr 4pm-12am (all 
day Saturday/Sunday), 
$2.25/hr 12am-7am, 
$5.95/hr 0800 service
Internet access, email
IBM Global 
Network
Auckland, 
Christchurch, 
Wellington
None
(a) $12/mo inc 3hrs (b) 
$55/mo inc 10hrs
(a) $5.75/hr (b) $5/hr 
no data volume
modem speed 
14.4kbps
Internet access
Internet 
Company of 
NZ
Auckland, 
Christchurch, 
Dunedin, 
Hamilton, 
Napier, Nelson, 
Palmerston 
North, Rotorua, 
Tauranga, 
Wellington
(a) $25, (b) 
$100 ($150 
comml)
(a) $10/mo inc 1Mb (b) 
$30/mo inc 3Mb 
($50/mo comml inc 
10Mb)
(a) $3.60/hr (b) 
$1.20/hr peak ($12/hr 
peak, $2.40/hr day 
comml) Int'l: $1.99/Mb 
peak, $0.99/Mb off-
peak
20 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, leased 
lines, ISDN
The Internet 
Group Ltd
Auckland, 
Christchurch, 
Wellington, 
Whangarei (via 
IGRIN)
$49 ($75 
comml)
(a) $20/mo Auckland 
($25.38 elsewhere) for 
6Mb int'l traffic (b) 
$30/mo Auckland 
($34.13 elsewhere) for 
30hrs c) $39/mo 
Auckland ($39.38 
elsewhere)
(a) Int'l: $0.99/Mb 
Nat'l: $0.50/Mb, (b) 
$0.99/hr, c) none
10 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, email, 
web page hosting
Internet 
ProLink NZ
Auckland
$49.95 
($89.95 
comml)
$19.95/mo ($49.95 
comml)
Int'l: $2.80/Mb peak, 
$0.98/Mb off-peak, 
Nat'l: 0.55/Mb
12 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, email
NetLink
Auckland, 
Christchurch, 
Wellington
$30 ($10 
email only)
$30/mo( for 30hrs/mo, 
2Mb Int'l, 20Mb Nat'l), 
$10 email
$1/hr, Int'l: $1.60 peak, 
$0.32 off-peak, Nat'l: 
$0.20
12 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, email
Voyager NZ 
Ltd
Nationwide
$35 for 5hrs 
connect time
None
$10/hr peak, $5/hr off-
peak
modem speed 
28.8kbps
Internet access, email
Xtra Nationwide $39.95
(a) $19.95/mo for 2hrs 
(b) $29.95 for 4 hrs c) 
$49.95 for 10 hrs 
discontinues 8/96
(a),(b) $6.95/hr c) 
$4.95/hr, switches to  
$2.50/hr flat 8/96
billing on 
Telecom bill
Internet access Telecom 
charges for ISDN: $945 
for modem, $120/mo 
CBD, $150/mo 
otherwise
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Name Location 1997
Set up Fee 
1997
On-going Charges 
1997
Connect Charges 1997
Customer 
Service 1997
Products 1997
Actrix Nationwide (a) $30 (b) $50
(a) $168/yr (b) 
$65/mo for 60hrs
(a) Int'l: $2.50/Mb peak, $0.80 
off-peak Nat'l: $0.50/Mb peak, 
$0.20 off-peak, (b)$2.50/hr
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, ISDN, 
web page 
hosting
CompuServe
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Dunedin, Hamilton, 
Wellington
None
(a) $17/mo for 2hrs 
(b) $39.50/mo for 
10hrs c) $70/mo for 
25hrs  
(a) $5.50/hr (b)&c) $3.95
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
page hosting
ClearNet Nationwide $34.95 None
$2.95 business hr, $2.50/hr Inet 
peak, $2.25/hr otherwise, 
$5.95/hr for 0800
24 hr help 
desk, modem 
speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, Web 
page hosting, 
ISDN
IBM Global 
Network
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington
None
(a) $12/mo for 5hrs 
(b)$45/mo for 
20hrs c) $90/mo for 
50hrs
(a) $2.50/hr (b) $2.25/hr c) 
$1.50/hr
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email
Internet 
Company of 
NZ
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Dunedin, Hamilton, 
Napier, Nelson, 
Palmerston North, 
Rotorua, Tauranga, 
Wellington
(a) $25, (b) 
$100 ($150 
comml) c) 
$100
(a) $10/mo inc 
1Mb+free off-peak 
access (b) $30/mo 
inc 3Mb ($50/mo 
comml inc 10Mb) 
c) $50/mo for 50hrs 
Auckland ($55 
elsewhere)
(a) $3.60/hr (b) $1.20/hr peak 
($12/hr peak, $2.40/hr day 
comml) Int'l: $1.99/Mb peak, 
$0.99/Mb off-peak c) 
$0.04/min no data volume 
charge
20 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
leased lines, 
ISDN
The Internet 
Group Ltd
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington, Whangarei 
(via IGRIN)
$49 ($75 
comml)
(a) $20/mo 
Auckland ($25.38 
elsewhere) for 6Mb 
int'l traffic (b) 
$30/mo Auckland 
($34.13 elsewhere) 
for 30hrs c) $39/mo 
Auckland ($39.38 
elsewhere)
(a) Int'l: $0.99/Mb Nat'l: 
$0.50/Mb, (b), c) none
10 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
page hosting
Internet 
ProLink NZ
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington
$49.95 ($89.95 
comml)
$19.95/mo 
($49.95/mo comml)
Int'l: $2.80/Mb peak, $0.98 off-
peak Nat'l: $0.55/Mb
modem speed 
56.6kbps
Internet access, 
email
NetLink
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington, Hamilton, 
Napier, Palmerston North, 
Nelson, Dunedin
$30 $10 email
$30/mo for 
30hrs+2Mb int'l 
traffic+20Mb nat'l 
traffic $10/mo 
email
$1/hr, Int'l: $1.60/Mb peak, 
$0.32/Mb off-peak Nat'l: 
$0.20/Mb
12 
users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8Mbps
Internet access, 
email
Voyager NZ 
Ltd
Nationwide
$35, switches 
to $29.95 3/97
(a) none (b) $55/mo 
for 10hrs , switches 
$49.95/mo for 
30hrs ($2.49/hr) 
3/97
(a) $7.95/hr peak, $4.95/hr off-
peak, (b) $4.95/hr no data 
volume charges switches 
$2.99/hr OR $5.99/hr 0800 
($4.49/hr prepaid) 3/97
modem speed 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Xtra
Auckland, Wellington, 
Christchurch, Dunedin, 
Gisborne, Hamilton, 
Napier, Nelson, New 
Plymouth, Palmerston 
North, Rotorua, Tauranga, 
Wanganui Wellington
$39.95 $35/mo for 20hrs $2.50/hr, $4.95/hr for 0800 
Charge on 
phone bill, 
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, 
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Name
Location 1998 (POPs if 
available)
Set up Fee 
1998 On-going Charges 1998 Connect Charges 1998
Customer 
Service 1998 Products 1998
Actrix Nationwide $49.95, $5 
(email only) 
$60/yr (email only) (a) 
$10/mo for 5Mb (b) $20/mo 
for 10Mb c) $30/mo for 
15Mb (d) $30/mo for 30hrs 
(e) $50/mo for 50hrs
Peak: (a) $3/Mb (b) 
$2.50/Mb c) $2/Mb Off-peak: 
(a) 1.50/Mb (b) $1.20/Mb c) 
$0.98/Mb, (d)&(e) $2.50/hr
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, email,  
newsgroup, web site 
hosting, secure server 
access, leased lines, national 
roaming Internet access, 
DDS, ISDN
CompuServe Nationwide
(a) $17/mo for 2hrs (b) 
$39.50/mo for 10hrs c) 
$70/mo for 25hrs
(a) $5.50/hr (b)&c) 3.95/hr
Internet access, email,  
newsgroups
ClearNet Nationwide (15POP) $34.95 None
$2.95 business hr, $2.50/hr 
Inet peak, $2.25/hr otherwise, 
$5.95/hr for 0800
24 hr help 
desk, modem 
speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, email, Web 
page hosting, ISDN
IBM Global 
Network
Nationwide+several 
countries
$70 (none for 
1999)
(a) $11.99/mo for 5hrs (b) 
$45/mo for 20hrs c) $90/mo 
for 50hrs
(a) $2.50/hr (b) $2.25/hr c) 
$1.50/hr ($6.19/hr for 
roaming)
Internet access, email,  
roaming access
Internet 
Company of 
NZ
Nationwide (POPs in 
Auckland, Wellington)
$50+3mo fee 
((d)&(e) $100)
(a) $10/mo for 5hrs+5Mb 
email only (b) $30/mo for 
20hrs+20Mb c) $50/mo for 
50hrs+50Mb (40hrs+40Mb 
outside calling area) (d) 
$75/mo for 60hrs+60Mb inc 
5 email addresses (e) 
$125/mo for 100hrs+100Mb
(a) $1.99/hr+$1.99/Mb peak, 
$0.50/Mb off-peak int'l (b) 
$1.20/hr+$1.20/Mb peak, 
$0.50/Mb off-peak int'l c) 
$1.50/hr+$1.50/Mb peak 
(time charge all the time 
outside calling area) (d)&(e) 
$1/hr+$1/Mb peak, $0.30/Mb 
off-peak int'l, $0.20/Mb nat'l
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, email,  
ISDN, DDS, wireless 
connections, roaming access
The Internet 
Group Ltd
Alexandra, Auckland, 
Balclutha, Christchurch, 
Dunedin, Hamilton, 
Invercargill, Oamaru, 
Queenstown, Timaru, 
Wellington, Whangarei
$59
(a) $45/mo (b)$480/yr c) 
$33.75/mo for 30hrs (d) 
$22.50/mo for 20hrs 
(e)$11.25/mo for 10hrs (f) 
$50/mo for 100hrs (toll-free)
c)&(f) $1.10/hr (d)&(e) 
$2.25/hr
Internet access, wireless 
local access, satellite service 
trans-Tasman and in 
Sydney, web site hosting, 
video conferencing, StarNet 
video multicasting, ISDN @ 
64kbps
Internet 
ProLink NZ
Nationwide
$49.95, 
($89.95 
comml)
(a) $19.95/mo (b) $26/mo 
for 6Mb c) $44/mo for 25Mb 
(accounts must be prepaid), 
$49.95/mo comml
Int'l: $2.80/Mb peak, 
$0.98/Mb off-peak Nat'l: 
$0.55/Mb
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, email,  
leased lines, newsgroups, 
chat rooms, 
NetLink
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington, Hamilton, 
Napier, Palmerston 
North, Nelson, Dunedin
(a) $28.60/mo for 2hrs (b) 
$39.31/mo 8hrs c) 
$64.63/mo flat rate
(a) $4.49/hr (b) $3.31/hr
Internet Access,  wireless 
local links, extranets via 
VPN service, ISDN service, 
fibre loops in Wellington.
Voyager NZ 
Ltd Nationwide
$30 ($26.67 ex 
GST comml 1-
5 users)
(a) $25/mo for 10hrs (b) 
$40/mo for 20hrs c) 
$52.50/mo for 30hrs (d) 
$75/mo for 50hrs 
(e)$125/mo for 100hrs, all 
accts prepaid, comml rates 
$3.36/hr Peak, $2.50/hr off-
peak (a) $3.36/hr (b)&c) 
$2.50/hr d) $2/hr (e) $1.50/hr
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, email, web 
site hosting
Xtra
Nationwide (all calls 
billed as local)
$39.95
(a) none (b) $35/mo for 
20hrs c) $45/mo for 50hrs
$2.50/hr ($4.95 for 0800 calls 
but "most" callers can dial 
087)
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, email
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Name Location 1999 
(POPs if available)
Set up Fee 
1999
On-going Charges 1999 Connect 
Charges 1999
Customer 
Service 1999
Products 1999 Notes 1999
Actrix Nationwide
None for 
residential 
dial up, 
$49.95 
corporate
Prepaid: $100 increments, 1c/min, 
Dial Up One: $7.95/mo for 15hrs 
Dial Up Two: $34.95/mo 
Corporate: $79.95/mo
$1/hr
Help Desk: 
24hrs Mon/Fri, 
7:30am-
10:30pm 
Sat/Sun Flat 
Rate max 6hrs 
Dial Up 56Kbps, 
ADSL, ISDN, Cable 
Access,  VPN
Dial Up One: 1 email address 
and 2.5M page Dial Up Two: 5 
email addresses and 5M page
CompuServe
Nationwide via toll 
free number None stated
Standard: $17/mo for 2hrs, Super 
Value: $39/mo for 10hrs, $70/mo 
for 25hrs
Standard: 
$5.50/hr else 
$3.95/hr
Call Centre 
Dial Up access, News 
service
ClearNet
Nationwide (local 
call access not 
available in all 
areas)
$34.95 
Usage: $2.50/hr,  $5.95/hr 0800 
Casual: $26.50/mo for 12hrs 
Serious: $38/mo for 20hrs, 
Power: $51/mo for 30hrs Flat 
Rate: $39.95/mo or $399.50/yr
$2.50/hr 24hr/7 day help 
desk
Roaming, web page 
hosting, ISDN, VPN
Flat rate only available for 
local access, Usage accounts 
must pay $5.96 for email, Web 
page is $4.40/mo for 5M and 
20M traffic
IBM Global 
Network
Nationwide (local 
call access not 
available in all 
areas)
$78.75 
Classic: $12/mo for 5hrs 
Convenience: $45/mo for 20hrs 
Mega: $90/mo for 50hrs
Classic: $2.50/hr 
Convenience: 
$2.25/hr Mega: 
$1.50/hr
Help Desk: 
normal business 
hrs, 5 email 
accounts for all 
Leased Lines
Internet 
Company of 
NZ
Nationwide
$34.95 
residential, 
$50 
corporate
Residential Lightnet: $14.95/mo 
for 20hrs, Midinet: $24.95/mo for 
50 hrs, Meganet: $34.95/mo for 
200hrs Business Entrynet:  
$30/mo for 25hrs+50Mb Sohonet: 
$50/mo for 50hrs+100Mb Biznet: 
$70/mo for 75hrs+150Mb 
Corpnet: $85/mo for 
100hrs+200Mb
$1/50/hr Help Desk
ISDN, permanent 
connections, VPN, 
fibre connections, 
wireless connections, 
ADSL, Cable access
Corporate gives 5 email 
accounts and free access from 
12am to 7am
The Internet 
Group Ltd Nationwide $39
Diamond: $39.50/mo Diamond 
Plus: $34.95/mo Sapphire: 
$29.95/mo for 60hrs Gold: 
$19.95/mo for 30hrs Bronze: $10 
for 10hrs
$1.50/hr
Help Desk: 
24hr/7 day
Satellite Internet 
connection, TV 
programming, 
Internet Telephony
Diamond Plus must be at local 
POP calling locations, all 
accounts have 5M web page
Internet 
ProLink NZ
Auckland, 
Hamilton, Napier, 
Wellington, 
Christchurch, 
Duneden
$49.95 
Standard: $19.95/mo Discovery: 
$26/mo for 6M Surfers: $44/mo 
for 25M 
Additional 
charges int 'l peak 
(9am-8pm) 
$2.80/Mb, int'l 
off 98c/Mb, nat'l: 
55c/Mb
ISDN dial up and 
permanent, wireless 
access, VPN, leased 
lines
Dial up accounts include 100K 
web page
NetLink
Auckland, 
Wellington, 
Christchurch
$30 
Netvalue15: $10/mo for 15hrs 
Netvalue50: $25/mo for 50hrs 
Netvalue100: $45/mo for 100hrs 
Netvalue200: $85/mo for 200hrs
Netvalue15: 
$1.25/hr,  
otherwise $1/hr
Help Desk: 
8:30am-5:30pm 
M/F
ISDN, permanent 
connections, VPN, 
fibre connections, 
Cable access, Frame 
Relay
Use 0867 access outside of 
POPs (IPNet)
Voyager NZ 
Ltd Nationwide
Casual, 
NetGain10
0: $30 
NetGain20
0: $37.50
Casual: $3.36/hr peak (8am-
12am), $2.50/hr otherwise 
NetGain100: $29.95/mo for 
100hrs NetGain200: $37.50/mo 
for 200hrs
$1.25/hr Help Desk
VPN, ISDN, leased 
lines, Internet 
telephony
5M web page
Xtra Nationwide $39.95 
NZPlan: $2.50/hr Advance10: 
$10/mo for 10hrs, Advance20: 
$25/mo for 20hrs Advance50: 
$35/mo for 50hrs Advance100: 
$65/mo for 100hrs Advance: 
$120/mo for 200hrs
Advance10: 
$1/hr 
Advance20:$1.25
/hr Advance50: 
70c/hr 
Advance100: 
65c/hr 
Help Desk 7am-
11pm, 7 days, 
$25/mo web site
VPN, ISDN, 
ecommerce
Mar 99: $2.50/hr nationwide 
May 31, 1999: Flat Rate 
$39.95/mo, Advance10 
$15/mo for 10hrs, Advance20 
$25/mo for 20 hrs, NZPlan 
$2.50/hr
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Name Web Site Bandwidth 
provider
Notes
Actrix www.actrix.co.nz or 
www.actrix.gen.nz 
NZIX 
1996/97 
Telecom 
IPNet 1999
Leased lines: $1000 connection fee, $115/mo plus Telecom charges for installation+monthly+Mb ISDN $50 connection fee, 
$50/mo, plus Telecom charges for installation+monthly Saturn supplied services available in some areas
CompuServe
www.compuserve.c
om, 
www.compuserve.c
om.au
CompuServ
e 
Network/PA
Cnet
ClearNet www.clear.net.nz CLIX web site hosting: $112.50/mo for 10M+200Mb/mo traffic
IBM Global 
Network
www.ibm.net, 
www.ibm.com/glob
alnetwork/newzeal.h
tml
IBM Global 
Network 
1996/97
Current name: IBM Internet Connection Services, accounts 5 additional user Ids and 3Mb storage
Internet 
Company of 
NZ
www.iconz.co.nz
NZIX 
1996/97, 
IPNet
Started in 1992 by Jon Clarke and Chris Thorpe "techno-nerds" with 100 accts. Purchased by Ron Woodrow in 1995 due to 
financial trouble. ISDN: dialup: $400 setup, $195/mo for 64kbps+$1.50/Mb int'l peak+$0.50 int'l off-peak+$0.20 nat'l 
peak+$2.40/hr, $300/mo for 128kbps, centrex:  $800 setup, $295/mo for 64kbps+$1.50/Mb peak+$0.50/Mb off-
peak+$0.20/Mb nat'l, $590/mo for 128kbps, call-back : $250 setup, $25/mo Connect Charge: $2.40/hr peak $1/hr offpeak 
Data Charge Int 'l:  $1/Mb peak ($1.50 perm connect) , $0.20 off-peak ($0.30 perm connect), Data Charge Nat'l: $0.20/Mb 
Leased Lines : $1500 setup, $155/mo analogue 28.8k, $195/mo DDS 48K, $295/mo DDS 64k, $495/mo DDS 128k VPN : 
web site design : $195 -$795 web site host: $250 setup e-commerce : $250 setup, $50/mo,$0.50/transaction, $50 setup secure 
server+$10/pg+$10/mo 64k wireless:  $500 set up, $195/mo, $1.50/Mb int'l peak, $0.30/Mb int 'l  off-peak, $0.20/Mb nat'l  
roaming: $25 setup, $1/hr non-ISDN, $2.50/hr ISDN global roaming : $7.50/hr, $1/connect DDS charges available
The Internet 
Group Ltd www.ihug.co.nz
NZIX and 
SITA 
1996/97 
some traffic 
on IPNet, 
Left IPNet 
1999
(a), (b) &(f) includes 5Mb home page, c) includes 2.5Mb home page.  web site hosting: $11.25/Mb/mo Starnet: Sky Tower: 
$767 installation (inc hardware, software, acct setup, dish) satellite data service: $868 installation (inc hardware, software,  
acct setup, dish) for 500kbps, $59/mo for 60hrs ($2/hr over) or $69/mo flat rate $20/mo for toll service. inc 5Mb home page. 
ISDN: $99 setup, $49/mo+$3/hr inc 5Mb home page, $99/mo for 60hrs+$2/hr inc 5Mb home page, $299/mo+$0.04/min for 
packet call-back and 5Mb home page
Internet 
ProLink NZ www.iprolink.co.nz
NZIX 1996 
CLIX 1997
Accounts include 100KB web page (1Mb for comml).  DDS installation $400, $95/mo for 64kbps plus Int'l: $1.45/Mb peak, 
$0.65/Mb off-peak, Nat'l: $0.15/Mb VPN set-up $150-$750, $75-$175/mo depending on level of security
NetLink www.netlink.co.nz
private 
1996/97 
Telecom 
IPNet 1999
Voyager NZ 
Ltd www.voyager.co.nz
ISDN 
provided by 
"Telephone 
company" 
Telecom 
IPNet 
ISDN:  $55 setup,  $8/hr for 64kbps (12.5hrs min), $15/hr for 128kbps (10hrs min), $900/mo 64kbps flat rate, $1750/mo 
128kbps flat rate DDS:  64kbps: $500 setup+$900/mo 128kbps: $750 setup+$1750/mo 256kbps: $1250 setup+$3500/mo 
VPN : $1326.67 setup+$900/mo+$6/hr ISDN dial connect+$2/hr analogue dial connect web site hosting : 1Mb inc in acct, 
$155 setup, $33.75/mo for 3 Mbytes storage+$10/Mb e-comm site: $1652 setup+$135/mo for 5Mb Phone: $20 
setup+prepaid cards for NZ, Aust, US, HK, S. Africa, Korea, UK, Japan
Xtra www.xtra.co.nz
NZIX 
96/97, IPNet 
1998/99
Internet service: Connection time charged per sec, all charges billed on Telecom bill web site hosting: $112.50/mo for 
10M+100Mb/mo traffic
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Appendix C: List of Internet Service Providers in New Zealand – Regional
Name Location 1996
Set Up Fee 
1996
On-going Charges 1996
Connect Charges 
1996
Customer 
Service 1996
Products 1996
Auckland Internet 
Exchange
Started in 1997
Bay City Internet
Bay of Plenty Internet 
Service (PlaNet FreeNZ)
Binary Brothers
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington
$30 ($10 e-
mail only)
$30/mo for 30hrs+20Mb 
nat'l traffic+2Mb int'l 
traffic ($10 email only) 
$1/hr, Int'l: $2.50/Mb 
Nat'l:$1.25/Mb
12 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
Web design
Bitworks Internet Services
Brice Parker Consultants Gisborne $82 $27/mo
Int'l: $3/Mb Nat'l: 
$1/Mb 
Internet access
Cave Rock Software Ltd Christchurch None $25/mo
Int'l: $5/Mb peak, 
$2.50/Mb off-peak 
Nat'l: $2.50/Mb 
3 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Central Plateau REAP 
(PlaNet NZ)
Taupo (REAP-Regional 
Education Activities 
Programme)
$60 for 
software
$15/mo
$2.35/hr or $4.50/Mb 
whichever comes 1st
modem speed: 
19.2kbps
Internet access
Comnet Technologies Ltd
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington
$50 ($99 
comml)
$15/mo ($45/mo comml)
Int'l: $3/Mb peak, 
$1/Mb off-peak Nat'l: 
$0.80/Mb peak, $0.50 
off-peak 
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
CompKarori Internet 
Services
Wellington
$30 ($10 
email only)
$30/mo for 30hrs+20Mb 
nat'l traffic+2Mb int'l 
traffic peak OR 10Mb 
off-peak ($10 email 
only)
$2/hr, Int'l: $3/Mb 
peak, $0.60/Mb off-
peak, Nat'l: $1/Mb
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
CyberNet Ltd Auckland $45
(a) $20/mo for 5Mb (b) 
$50/mo for 25Mb c) 
$100/mo for 100Mb 
Int'l: $1.95/Mb peak, 
$0.95/Mb off-peak 
Nat'l: $0.40/Mb 
15 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
CyberXpress
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington
$50 $30/mo for 15hrs
$3/hr no data volume 
charges
12-15 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Deep South Networks Dunedin
$20 ($40 
comml)
$110/yr ($295/yr 
comml)
$2.65/hr, no data 
volume charges
20 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
web advertising
Digital Edge Ltd Started in 1997
Earthlight (PlaNet NZ) Dunedin $40
$35/qtr or $120/yr ($120 
email only with no time 
charges) ($300/yr 
comml)
$3/hr, no data volume 
charge
15 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Eastern Southland Internet Gore
$25 ($45 
comml)
$150/yr ($230/yr 
comml)
$4.50/hr no data 
volume charges
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Efficient Software Internet
Alexandra, Balclutha, 
Dunedin, Invercargill, 
Oamaru, Queenstown, 
Timaru
$15
$135/yr ($300/yr 
comml)
Queenstown: $4.50/hr 
$3.36 elsewhere, no 
data volume charges
15 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
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Name Location 1996
Set Up Fee 
1996
On-going Charges 1996 Connect Charges 1996
Customer 
Service 1996
Products 1996
EnterNet Online Ltd Tauranga
$50 ($100 
comml)
$15/mo ($50 comml)
Int'l: $2.80/Mbyte peak, $1.40/Mb 
off-peak, $0.70 night owl 
($1.10/Mb comml) Nat'l: 
$0.50/Mb 
8 users/modem 
modem speed 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
hosting, back-up 
and online help
ESNet Christchurch
gisborne.net
GlobeNet Wellington $49
$30/mo for 30hrs+10Mb 
nat'l+5Mb int'l
$1/hr, Int'l: $1.50/Mb 
Nat'l:$0.50/Mb
12 per 
users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Hindin Communications Christchurch (nationwide 
via PacNet)
from $50 $20/mo $2.40/hr, Int'l: $4/MbNat'l: 
$1.45/Mb
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
i-Max Auckland None $4-12/mo
$0.30-$1.80/hr, Int'l: (prepaid) 
$2.80/Mb peak, $1.50 off-peak, 
$3.60/Mb peak,  $2.30 off-peak 
Nat'l: $1.20/Mb prepaid, $2/Mb
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
inet
Interactive Internet
Internet Hawke's Bay Hastings, Napier None $15/mo Int'l: $4/Mb Nat'l: $2.50/Mb modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Internet New Zealand 
Online
Auckland $60 $20/mo ($30/mo comml) Int'l: $2.75/Mb peak, $1.50/Mbyte 
off-peak Nat'l: $0.80/Mb 
24 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Internet Queenstown Queenstown None $175/yr ($295 comml) $4/hr, no data volume charges
15 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Jet International Hamilton Closed in 1996
KiwiConnect Internet 
Services Auckland
$40 ($100 
comml)
(a) $20/mo for 5Mb (b) 
$40/mo for 20 Mb
Int'l: $2.50/Mb peak $0.95 off-
peak, Nat'l: $0.50/Mb
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Kiwi Internet Auckland Private Service
Lloyd Group Hamilton Started in 1998
Lynx Internet Christchurch $75 $15/mo Int'l: $5/Mb, Nat'l: $2/Mb
20 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Manawatu Internet 
Services Ltd (part of 
PlaNet)
Levin, Palmerston North $45 $135/yr ($220 comml) Int'l: $3.95/Mb, Nat'l: $0.50/Mb
15 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps $45 
per hour for on-
site service
Internet access
Medi@net
Microsoft Network Auckland, Wellington $28/mo inc 2hr $19/hr, no data volume charges
modem speed: 
14.4kbps
Private on-line 
connections, 
Internet access
Midland Internet Hamilton
$50 ($100 
comml)
$16/mo ($50/mo comml)
Int'l: $3/Mb peak, $1.50/Mb  off-
peak, $0.75/Mb way off-peak, 
Nat'l: $0.50/Mb, comml: 
$1.25/Mb 24hr access
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
domain name 
registration
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Name Location 1996
Set Up Fee 
1996
On-going Charges 1996 Connect Charges 1996
Customer 
Service 1996
Products 1996
Millenium Internet 
Services
Minidata
Molten Media
NetAccess Christchurch $50
$10/mo ($45/mo comml) 
$108/yr ($486/yr 
comml)
Int'l: $4/Mb peak, $2/Mb off-peak 
Nat'l: $1/Mb 
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Netbyte Internet Auckland
$50 ($100 
comml)
$30/mo ($50 comml inc 
60 Mb)
Int'l: $1.75/Mb, Nat'l: $0.50/Mb
6 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
DDS, ISDN, web 
site hosting
NetGain No Information
NetGate Communications 
Ltd.
Auckland $30
$20/mo ($45/mo 
Powerusers) for 8 peak 
hours,  all off-peak hrs 
and 5Mb per mo
$0.60/hr peak Int'l: $1.95/Mb 
peak, $0.95/Mb off-peak Nat: 
$0.35/Mb
5 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
NorthInfoLinE (NILE) Whangarei $50 $20/mo Int'l: $2/Mb, Nat'l: $0.50/Mb
8 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
NZ Flat Net $45 Closed in 1996
NZNET Internet Services 
Ltd.
Auckland, Hamilton, 
Wellington
$30
Auckland: $10/mo ($30 
comml) Wellington: 
$15/mo ($35 comml)
Int'l: $4.80/Mb peak, $2.50/Mb off-
peak, Nat'l: $1.50/Mb
9 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Omega Centauri Internet Hamilton
$22.50 
($60 
comml)
$13.50/mo ($40/mo 
comml) 
 Int'l: $3/Mb ($2.50Mb comml) 
peak $2/Mb ($1.50Mb comml) off-
peak Nat'l: $0.20/Mb
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
OUTnet Internet Started in 1997
Paradise Internet Started in 1998
Plain Communications Christchurch
Stopped offering service 
directly to public in 
1997
30 modems 
(1997)
PlaNet NZ Auckland
PlaNet (NZ) Bay of Plenty  
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Rotorua
$40 ($60 
comml) 
$80 for 
$11-$16/mo ($40-60/mo 
comml)
$2-$4/M
30 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
PlaNet (NZ) Canterbury    
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Christchurch
$50 ($60 
comml)
$135/yr ($160 comml) 
for 1 hr/day
$0.15/min Int'l: $4.90/Mb peak 
$2.90/Mb off-peak Nat'l: 
$2.50/Mb peak $1.50/Mb off-peak
15 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
PlaNet (NZ) Hawke's Bay
PlaNet (NZ) Nelson       
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Nelson $40 ($60 
comml)
$180/yr ($210 comml) Int'l $4/Mb Nat'l $1/Mb
18 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
PlaNet NZ (mlb.planet)
PlaNet (NZ) Wanganui Wanganui Stopped offering service in 1996
PlaNet (NZ) Wellington    
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Wellington $75
$150/yr ($200/yr for 
Newsgroup)
Int'l $3/Mb Nat'l $0.60/Mb Internet access
PlaNet Free NZ
Auckland, Blenheim, 
Christchurch, Gisborne, 
Hamilton, Kapiti Coast, 
Tauranga,  Wellington
$40-$75
$25-$35/mo, $202/6 mo, 
$382/yr for 60-
90min/day+20Mb int'l 
traffic/mo+all nat'l 
traffic
Time charge, Int'l: $1.50-
$2.50/Mb
12-20 
users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
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Name Location 1996
Set Up Fee 
1996
On-going Charges 1996 Connect Charges 1996
Customer 
Service 1996
Products 1996
PlaNet Free NZ Gaia (part 
of PlaNet Free NZ)
Christchurch $50 $135/yr Int'l: $5/Mb Nat'l: $1/Mb
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
PC Net Stopped offering service in 1996
Quik Internet
RAM Management Napier,  Hastings $22.50/mo Int'l $4/Mb Nat'l $2.50/Mb
12 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Scenicland Internet Ltd. Started service in 1997
SineSurf Started in 1997
SirraNet Christchurch None
(a) $15/mo ($40/mo 
comml) for 20 min (b) 
$40/mo ($90/mo comml)
(a) $0.15/10 min, Int'l $7/Mb peak 
$4.50/Mb off-peak Nat'l $3/Mb 
peak $2/Mb off-peak (b) $0.30/10 
min Int'l $4.5/Mb peak $2.50/Mb 
off-peak Nat'l $2/Mb peak $1/Mb 
off-peak
5 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Sky Surf Internet Started service in 1997
Southern Internet Services Christchurch $50
(a) $16.85/mo 15 hrs (b) 
$28.13/mo 30 hrs c) 
$45/mo 60 hrs (d) 
$61.88/mo 90 hrs 
$0.95/hr, Int'l: $4/Mb peak 
$2.50/Mb off-peak Nat'l: 
$1.80/Mb peak $1.35/Mb off-peak
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
South Net, South Net 
Queenstown, South Net Te 
Anau
Invercargill $99/yr ($199 comml) $3/hr ($10/hr 0800) no data 
volume charges
12 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Synapse Networks
Taranaki Netsource Started service in 1997
Taranaki Polytechnic New Plymouth Stopped offering public in 1996 or 1997
The Internet Group 
Northland Ltd (IGRIN)
Started service in 1997
The Net No Information
The Packing Shed Started service in 1997
TIPNET New Plymouth None (a) $15/mo (b) none
(a) $0.01/min, Int'l $5/Mb Nat'l 
$1/Mb (b) $5/hr no data volume 
charges
10-14 
users/modem 
modem speed 
28.8kbps
Internet access
TpNet Started service in 1997
TpNetLink Christchurch $40
$10/mo w/data volume 
charging $40/mo w/out 
data volume charging
Int'l: $4.95/M Nat'l: $2.50 8 users/modem
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Name Location 1996
Set Up Fee 
1996
On-going Charges 1996 Connect Charges 1996
Customer 
Service 1996
Products 1996
University of Canterbury Christchurch None None
$0.03/min Int'l: $4/M peak, $2/M 
off-peak, $0.80/M way off-peak 
Nat'l: $1/M
modem speed: 
28.8 kbps
Internet access, 
web page hosting
Virtual Comm-Unity Started service in 1998
Waiariki Polytech Rotorua
$112.50 
coml
$11.25/mo $56.50/mo 
comml. $2.25/M off-peak, $$4.50/M peak
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Wairarapa Internet NZ Started service in 1997
Wanganui Internet Wanganui None $85/yr $240/yr comml
$30/mo for 8Mb Int'l and 2Mb 
Nat'l then $4.95/Mb Int'l and 
$1.75/Mb Nat'l
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Wanganui Polytechnic Wanganui $25 $80/yr ($150/yr comml)
Nat'l: $0.20/Mb Int'l: $3.60/Mb or 
$4.20/Mb comml  peak, $1.50/Mb 
or $1.80/Mb comml off-peak
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Wave Internet Services
Auckland, Hamilton, 
Tauranga, 
Thames/Coromandel, 
Whakatane
Economy 
$25 
Standard 
$50 
Premium 
$100
Economy none Standard 
$30/mo Premium 
$60/mo
Economy $5/hr Standard none (off-
peak only,  30hrs max)      
Premium none $1.50/Mbyte
8 users/modem 
modem speed 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Web InterNet Started service in 1997
Web World Ltd Auckland
None for 
data acct, 
$20 for 
time  acct
$3.63-$17.78/month 
$395/year (comml)
$13.50/hr or Nat'l: $0.44/Mbyte 
Int'l $0.89/Mbyte
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
web page hosting
Wizkid® Internet Limited Started service in 1997
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Name Location 1997 Set Up Fee 1997
On-going Charges 
1997
Connect Charges 1997
Customer 
Service 1997
Products 1997
Auckland Internet 
Exchange
Auckland None $9.95/mo $0.39/hr
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
ISDN
Bay City Internet
Bay of Plenty Internet 
Service (PlaNet FreeNZ)
Binary Brothers
Auckland, Christchurch, 
Wellington None
$30/month for 
30hrs+2Mb peak+nat'l 
traffic, $10/month 
email
$1/hr, Int'l: $2/Mb peak, 
$1/Mb off-peak
12 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
web design, 
intranet design
Bitworks Internet Services
Brice Parker Consultants Gisborne $55
$27/mo for 3Mb int'l 
traffic
$8.75/hr Int'l: $3/Mb Nat'l: 
$1/Mb 
12 users/modem Internet access
Cave Rock Software Ltd Christchurch None
(a)$30/mo no time 
charge (b) $30/mo for 
1hr/day+nat'l 
traffic+off-peak 
traffic c) $25/mo for 
1hr/day
$3/hr, Int'l: $2/Mb peak, 
$0.75/Mb off-peak (a&c) 
Nat'l: $0.25/Mb (a&c)
8 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Central Plateau REAP 
(PlaNet NZ)
Taupo None
(a) $30/mo (b) $30 c) 
$25
(a) $2.50/hr, Int'l: $2/Mb 
peak, $0.75/Mb off-peak 
Nat'l: $0.25/Mb
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Comnet Technologies Ltd
Auckland, Wellington, 
Christchurch
$50 ($99 
comml)
$15/mo ($45 comml)
Nat'l: $0.80/Mb peak, 
$0.50/Mb off-peak 
Int'l:$3/Mb peak, $1/Mb off-
peak
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
ISDN, leased 
lines
CompKarori Internet 
Services
Wellington $30 ($10 email)
$30/mo for 
30hrs+20Mb nat'l 
traffic+2Mb peak int'l 
traffic OR 10Mb off-
peak traffic ($10/mo 
email)
$2/hr, Int'l: $3/Mb peak, 
$0.60/Mb off-peak, Nat'l: 
$1/Mb
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
CyberNet Ltd Auckland
Service now supplied 
by Auckland Internet 
Exchange
CyberXpress Christchurch $15 $29.50/mo for 15hrs
$3/hr no data volume 
charges
12 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Deep South Networks Dunedin $39.95 None $2.98/hr, no data volume 
charge
15 users/modem 
modem 
speed:33.6kbps
Internet access, 
web advertising
Digital Edge Ltd Auckland None
(a) $2/mo (b) $32/mo 
40hrs c) $25/mo 40 
hrs student (d)$55/mo 
(a) $2/hr, $1.50/hr otherwise
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
ISDN, leased 
lines, DDS
Earthlight (PlaNet NZ) Dunedin $40
$35/qtr, $120/yr email 
only ($300 comml)
$3/hr, no data volume charge
15 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Eastern Southland Internet Gore $75 None
$4/hr, no data volume 
charges
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
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Name Location 1997 Set Up Fee 1997
On-going Charges 
1997
Connect Charges 1997
Customer 
Service 1997
Products 1997
Efficient Software Internet
Alexandra, Balclutha, 
Christchurch, Dunedin, 
Invercargill, Oamaru, 
Queenstown, Timaru
(a) $15 (b) $59
(a) $135/yr ($300/yr 
comml) (b) $45/mo 
($55/mo comml)
(a) Queenstown, Oamaru, 
Timaru, Balclutha: $4.50/hr 
Invercargill,  Dunedin: $3.36 
(b) none, no data volume 
charges (a)or (b)
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
EnterNet Online Ltd Tauranga
$50 ($100 
comml)
$15/mo ($50 comml)
Int'l: $2.80/Mb peak 
$1.40/Mb off-peak, 
$0.70/Mb night owl, 
$1.10/Mb comml Nat'l: 
$0.50/Mb
8 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
web page 
hosting
ESNet May have been a subsidary of Efficient Software
gisborne.net
GlobeNet Wellington $39.95
(a) None (b) $35/mo 
for 30 hrs+5Mb int'l 
traffic+10Mb nat'l 
traffic
(a) $2.50/hr (b) $1/hr, Int'l: 
$1.50/Mb Nat'l: $0.50/Mb
12 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Hindin Communications Christchurch $50 $20/mo
$2.40/hr, Int'l: $2.50/Mb, 
Nat'l: $0.60/Mb
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email, 7 day 
help desk
i-Max
Stopped operation in 
1996
inet
Interactive Internet
Internet Hawke's Bay Napier, Hastings $25
$15/mo (free if no 
usage)
$2.95/hr OR $2.75/Mb
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
hosting, web 
Internet New Zealand 
Online
Auckland $60
$20/mo ($35/mo 
comml)
Int'l: $2.75/Mb peak, 
$1.50/Mbyte off-peak Nat'l: 
$0.80/Mb 
24 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
Internet Queenstown
Operation taken over 
by South Net
Jet International
Started and closed in 
1997
KiwiConnect Internet 
Services
Closed in 1997
Kiwi Internet 
May be private 
service
Lloyd Group Started in 1998
Lynx Internet Christchurch $75 $15/mo Int'l: $5/Mb Nat'l: $2/Mb
20 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Manawatu Internet 
Services Ltd (part of 
PlaNet)
Palmerston North, Levin $45
$135/yr ($220/yr 
comml for 5 accounts)
Int'l: $2.70/Mb Nat'l: 
$0.72/Mb
15 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Medi@net
Microsoft Network
Stopped offering 
service to public in 
1997
Midland Internet Hamilton $25
Bronze: $45/mo flat 
rate Silver: none 
Gold: $20/mo comml
Bronze: none Silver: 
$2.50/hr Gold: $0.95/hr
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
hosting
Millenium Internet 
Services
Minidata
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Name Location 1997 Set Up Fee 1997
On-going Charges 
1997
Connect Charges 1997
Customer 
Service 1997
Products 1997
Molten Media
NetAccess Christchurch $50
$10/mo or $108/yr  
($45/mo or $486/yr 
comml)
Int'L: $4/Mb peak $2/Mb off-
peak Nat'l: $1/Mb
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Netbyte Internet
Iprolink took over 
operation in 1997
NetGain No information
NetGate Communications 
Ltd.
Auckland $30
$20/mo ($45/mo 
powerusers) for 8hrs 
peak+all off-
peak+5/Mb
$0.60/hr, Int'l: $1.95/Mb 
peak, $0.95/Mb off-peak 
Nat'l: $0.35
5 users/modem, 
modem 
speed:28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
NorthInfoLinE (NILE)
Stopped operation in 
1997
NZ Flat Net $45 $35/mo
NZNET Internet Services 
Ltd.
Auckland, Wellington, 
Hamilton
$30
Auckland: $10/mo 
($30/mo comml) 
Wellington: $15/mo 
($35/mo comml)
Int'l: $4.80 peak, $2.50 off-
peak Nat'l: $1.50/Mb
9 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Omega Centauri Internet
Stopped operation in 
1997
OUTnet Internet Auckland $50 ($100 with 
installation)
$50/mo None modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Paradise Internet
Plain Communications
Began service 
operation as 
CyberXpress
PlaNet NZ Auckland
PlaNet (NZ) Bay of Plenty  
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Stopped operation in 1997.
PlaNet (NZ) Canterbury    
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Christchurch $15 $120/yr for 1hr/day
$0.015/min, Int'l: $2.85/Mb 
peak, $1.50/Mb off-peak 
Nat'l: $1.50/Mb peak, 
$0.85/Mb off-peak
15 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email, 
PlaNet (NZ) Hawke's Bay
PlaNet (NZ) Nelson       
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Nelson
$40 ($60 
comml)
$180/yr ($210/yr 
comml)
Int'l: $4/Mb Nat'l: $1/Mb
18 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
PlaNet NZ (mlb.planet)
PlaNet (NZ) Wanganui
PlaNet (NZ) Wellington    
(part of PlaNet NZ)
Wellington $75
$150/yr ($200/yr inc 
newsgroups)
Int'l: $3/Mb Nat'l: $0.60/Mb
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
PlaNet Free NZ
Keri Keri, Whangarei, 
Auckland, Hamilton, 
Bay of Plenty, Gisborne, 
Napier, Wellington, 
Wairarapa, 
Christchurch, Blenheim
$75
$20-$70/mo, $202/6 
mo, $383/yr
$1/hr, Int'l: $1.10-$2.50/Mb 
(overdata) Nat'l: free
12-20 
users/modem, 
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email
PlaNet Free NZ Gaia (part 
of PlaNet Free NZ)
Christchurch $50 $135/yr Int'l: $5/Mb Nat'l: $1/Mb
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
PC Net launched 11/97
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On-going Charges 
1997
Connect Charges 1997
Customer 
Service 1997
Products 1997
Quik Internet
RAM Management Napier, Hastings $33.75
$22.50/mo+lessor of 
connect time or data 
volume charge
$2.8125/hr OR Int'l: 
$2.8125/Mb peak, 
$1.125/Mb off-peak Nat'l: 
$2.025/Mb peak, 
$0.84375/Mb off-peak
12 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email
Scenicland Internet Ltd.
Greymouth, Hokitika, 
Westport
None None
$4.50/hr no data volume 
charge
10 users/modem 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
hosting
SineSurf Auckland $56.25 $35/mo None
No frills, no 
helpdesk, modem 
speed: 28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
SirraNet Christchurch None
(a) $15/mo for 20 min 
($40/mo comml) (b) 
$40/mo ($90 comml)
(a) $0.15/10min, Int'l: $7/Mb 
peak, $4.50/Mb off-peak 
Nat'l: $3/Mb peak, $2/Mb off-
peak (b) $0.30/10min, Int'l: 
$4.50/Mb peak, $2.50/Mb 
off-peak Nat'l: $2/Mb peak, 
$1/Mb off-peak
5 users/modem, 
modem 
speed:28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
Sky Surf Internet Auckland $49
(a) none (b) $10/mo 
for 10hrs c) $25/mo 
for 30hrs (d) $39/mo 
flat rate
(a) $2/hr (b) $1.50/hr c) 
$1/hr (d) None, no data 
volume charge
7 users/modem 
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
design, web 
hosting
Southern Internet Services Christchurch $50
(a) $16.85/mo 15 hrs 
(b) $28.13/mo 30 hrs 
c) $45/mo 60 hrs (d) 
$61.88/mo 90 hrs 
Int'l: $4/Mb peak $2.50/Mb 
off-peak Nat'l: $1.80/Mb 
peak $1.35/Mb off-peak
10 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
South Net, South Net 
Queenstown, South Net Te 
Anau
Invercargill, 
Queenstown
$39.95 includes 
$22.50 time 
credit
None
$2.25/hr peak, $1.13/hr off-
peak
8 users/modem in 
Queenstown&Te 
Anau, modem 
speed: 56.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, web 
hosting
Synapse Networks
Taranaki Netsource
New Plymouth, 
Stratford, Hawera
$39.96 None $0.60/hr, $0.63/Mb
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email,  leased 
lines, ISDN
Taranaki Polytechnic
The Internet Group 
Northland Ltd (IGRIN)
Whangarei, Keri Keri, 
Kaitaia, Dargaville
$50
(a) $38/mo for 120hrs 
(b) $20/mo for 20hrs 
c)$10/mo for 10hrs 
(d) none
(a) $1/hr (b) $2/hr c) $2/hr 
(d) $1.50/Mb
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, account 
(d) is a radio 
connection @ 
2Mbps
The Net $150/yr       
 $2.40/hr or $1.50/Mb 
international traffic
The Packing Shed Franklin
(a) $45 inc 5 hrs 
(b) none
(a) none (b) $45/mo 
for 40hrs
(a) $3.60/hrr (b) $1.08/hr
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access
TIPNET New Plymouth None $5/mo $0.60/hr, $0.65/Mb
10-14 
users/modem, 
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access, 
email
TpNet Christchurch
(a) None (b) 
$56.25 ($84.37 
comml)
(a) $110/yr ($200/yr 
comml) (b) $45/mo 
($56.25 comml) no 
connect charges
Nat'l: $1.50/Mb Int'l:4/Mb
8 users/modem 
modem speed 
28.8kbps
Internet access 
TpNetLink
Purchased by NetLInk 
in 1997.
University of Canterbury
Stopped offering 
service to public in 
1997
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1997
Connect Charges 1997
Customer 
Service 1997
Products 1997
Virtual Comm-Unity Auckland $30
(a) $15/mo for 3hrs 
(b) $30/mo for 6hrs
(a) $6/hr (b) $5/hr no data 
volume charge
modem speed: 
28.8kbps
Internet access 
via dial up and 
kiosk
Waiariki Polytech 
closed and customers 
transferred to Wave 
Internet
Wairarapa Internet NZ
Masterton, South 
Wairarapa
None None
$4.50/hr OR Int'l: $2.81/Mb 
Nat'l: $2.03
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
radio links
Wanganui Internet No information
Wanganui Polytechnic No information
Wave Internet Services
Auckland, Hamilton, 
Rotorua, Tauranga, 
Thames/Coromandel, 
Whakatane
Economy $25 
Standard $50 
Premium $100
Economy $10/mo for 
2hrs S tandard $30/mo 
for 30hrs Premium 
$60/mo
Economy $5/hr Standard 
$2.50/hr (off-peak only, 
30hrs max) Premium none, 
No data volume charges
10 users/modem 
modem speed 
33.6kbps
Internet access
Web InterNet Auckland $45
(a) $30/mo for 25hrs 
(b) $45/mo for 60hrs 
c) $55/mo flat rate
(a) $1.10/hr (b) $1/hr
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email, 128kbps 
routing
Web World Ltd Auckland
(a) $49.95 
(b)&c) none
(a) none (b) $9.95/mo 
for 5hrs, $29.95/mo 
for 15hrs, $49.95 for 
30hrs c) $10/mo
(a) $2.50/hr (b) $2.50/hr c) 
Int'l: $1.95/Mb peak, 
$0.95/Mb off-peak Nat'l: $ 
0.50/Mb
8 users/modem, 
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, 
email,  web page 
hosting
Wizkid® Internet Limited Christchurch $45 $15/mo
Int'l: $3/Mb peak, $2/Mb off-
peak Nat'l: free
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, 
email,  web page 
hosting, ISDN
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1998
Set Up Fee 1998 On-going Charges  1998 Connect Charges 1998
Customer Service 
1998
Products 1998
Auckland Internet 
Exchange
Auckland $33.69
(a)$67.16/6mo for 60hrs email  only 
(b) $134.66/6mo for 150hrs c) 
$202.16/6mo for 300hrs (d) 
$269.66/6mo for 600hrs (e) 
$404.66/6mo for 600hrs (f) 
$607.16/6mo for 900hrs comml
Internet access, email, e-
commerce, dialup/dedicated ISDN, 
leased-lines
Bay City Internet Timaru now www.timaru.com no price info
modem speed: 
33.3kbps
Internet access , email, leased lines, 
web s ite design & hosting
Bay of Plenty Internet  
Service (PlaNet 
FreeNZ)
Bay of Plenty
$40 ($75 for 1hr 
service)
(a) $100/yr email only 
(5hrs+5Mb)/mo (b) $20/mo or 
$210/yr for (20hrs+15Mb)/mo c) 
$25/mo or $270/yr for 
(30hrs+20Mb)/mo (d) $35/mo or 
$382/yr for (45hrs+30Mb)/mo (e) 
$70/mo or $770/yr for 
(50hrs+100Mb)/mo (f) $70/mo or 
$770/yr for (120hrs+40Mb)/mo
$1/hr and $0.60/Mb for 
Int 'l t raffic
modem speed for 
dial up:  33.6kbps, 
for ISDN 56.6kbps
Internet  access, email , ISDN, 
analogue leased lines, news groups
Binary Brothers Coromandel no price info
Internet access, email , secure 
server, newsgroups
Bitworks Internet  
Services
$40 ($10 if 
download s /w)
(a) none but hrs  pre-paid (b) $45/mo 
(both inc. email  and home page)
$2.20/hr
Internet  access, email , web site 
design & hosting, e-commerce 
si tes
Brice Parker 
Consultants
Gisborne none
Data Plan $27/mo for 10Mb int'l 
traffic Time Plan $27/mo for 10hrs 
Corporate Plan $56.25/mo for 20 
access accounts
Data Plan Int'l:  $2/Mb 
peak, $1/Mb off-peak 
National: $0.75/Mb Time 
Plan $2.95/hr Corporate 
Plan Int 'l:  $1.68/Mb peak, 
$0.84/Mb off-peak Nat'l : 
$0.56/Mb
Internet  access, email , newsgroups 
Cave Rock Software 
Ltd
Christchurch
$30 all  accounts 
except corporate 
at  $120
time: none, time+1 hr/day: $30/mo 
t ime+2hr/day: $45/mo 
prepay20hrs/mo: $25/mo 
prepay60hrs/mo: $45/mo home 
(1hr/day): $15/mo standard: $30/mo 
bulk: $45/mo corp: $60/mo webhost: 
$35/mo
$2.50/hr for all time based 
accounts, Int'l/Nat 'l home: 
$0.75/$0.25, standard: 
$0.75/$0.25, bulk:  
$0.30/$0.15 corp:  
$0.75/$0.25
Internet  access, web site hosting, 
email , national and international 
news access, ISDN, DDS, V.90, 
secure transaction server
Central Plateau REAP 
(PlaNet NZ)
Comnet Technologies  
Ltd
Auckland, 
Wellington, 
Christchurch
No price info on page
CompKarori Internet 
Services
Wellington $30
$30 for 30hrs+2Mb int'l traffic peak 
OR 10Mb off-peak+20Mb nat'l 
traffic
$2/hr, Int'l : $3/Mb peak, 
$0.60 off-peak, Nat'l: 
$1/Mb
Internet  access, email , web site 
hosting
CyberNet Ltd
CyberXpress 30+ $10 manual
Personal $15/mo Business $20/mo 
(Personal accounts are prepaid) 
Flatrate $32/mo for 3hrs/day peak 
free for off-peak
Personal $1/hr for 15hrs 
then $2.50/hr Business 
$1/hr for 15hrs then 
$2.50/hr
Internet access, ISDN, web si te 
hosting, radio connections
Deep South Networks Dunedin
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Name
Location 
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Set Up Fee 1998 On-going Charges  1998 Connect Charges 1998
Customer Service 
1998
Products 1998
Digital Edge Ltd Auckland $27
(a) none (b) $36/mo 45hrs c)$28/mo 
student 45 hrs d)$39.95/mo  75hrs  
(e) $60/mo 110hrs (f) $45/mo (g) 
$32/mo comml a-e prepaid
(a) $1.95/hr (b) $1.50/hr 
c)&(d) $1/hr
web design, modem 
speed: 56.6kbps(flat 
rate restricted to 
33.6kbps)
Internet  access, email , email/fax, 
ISDN, secure web servers, 
dedicated dial-up modem $75 
setup & $140/mo
Earthlight  (PlaNet NZ) Dunedin
$40 (none for 
email only)
$35/qtr or $120/yr (email only must 
be paid yrly in advance)
$3/hr
help desk, free web 
page 500kb for full 
access, max 5Mb 
email for email  only
Internet access, email
Eastern Southland 
Internet
Gore $59 $10/mo for 3.5 hrs $2.81/hr 24hr help desk
Internet  access, email , web site 
hos ting, web si te design
Efficient Software 
Internet
Purchased by ihug in 1997.
En terNet Online Ltd Tauranga
70 ($100 
comml)
$15/mo ($50/mo comml)
Int 'l: $2.80/Mb peak, $1.40 
off-peak, $0.70 (11pm to 
7am) $1.10/Mb comml 
Nat'l:  $0.50/Mb
help desk, web page 
design, 5 email 
accounts  comml, 
free web page 
500kb (2Mb 
comml)
Internet  access, email , web page 
hosting, radio connections , 
newsgroup, chat room
ESNet
gisborne.net Now PlaNet Free NZ Internet access
GlobeNet Wellington $35.51
Freedom: none, Prepay30: $35/mo 
for 30hrs Prepay60: $50/mo for 
60hrs
Freedom: $2.22/hr 
Prepays: $2/hr
Internet  access, email , web site 
hosting, ISDN
Hindin Communications Christchurch No direct dialup Internet access
Consult ing e-commerce solutions, 
EDI, online databases ie National 
Library, ISP set ups, Intranets
i-Max
inet Christchurch None
$15/mo for 20hrs, $35/mo for 
100hrs, $50/mo for 120hrs, $70/mo 
for 200hrs
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Interactive Internet Gone to www.es.co.nz
Internet  access, email , email/fax, 
web design & hosting, intranet  
services
Internet Hawke's Bay
Napier, 
Hastings
$25 $15/mo $2.50/hr OR $2.50/Mb Internet access, email
Internet New Zealand 
Online
No si te.
Internet Queenstown Service taken over by South Net
Jet  International Stopped operation in 1997
KiwiConnect Internet 
Services
Kiwi Internet 
Lloyd Group
Auckland, 
Hamilton
$100, $200 for 
dedicated 
$45/mo, $100/mo for dedicated 
modem
None 6 users/modem
Internet access, web site design and 
hosting, xDSL, PABX, DDS
Lynx Internet Christchurch
$30 ($75 for on-
site ins tal lat ion)
(a) $15/mo (b) $30/mo 
(a) Int'l:  $3.50/Mb Nat'l: 
$1.50/Mb (b) Int'l: 
$1.20/Mb Nat'l : $0.60/Mb
Internet  access, email , web site 
hosting, ISDN
Manawatu Internet  
Services  Ltd (part  of 
PlaNet)
Manawatu, 
Levin, 
Dannervirke, 
Palmerston 
North
$15 ($45 with 
onsite 
installation)
$135/yr or $12.50/mo for 3Mb/mo 
($220/yr comml for 5Mb/mo)
Int'l : $1.99/Mb (email  
traffic $2.25/Mb) Nat'l:  
$0.56/Mb (email traffic 
$0.67/Mb) Cached: 
$1.41/Mb
70 incoming lines, 
modem speed: 
33.6kbps
Internet access, email, newsgroup, 
web si te hosting
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Customer Service 
1998 Products 1998
Medi@net Advertised on Canterbury Online but no site.
Internet access, web site design & 
hosting
Microsoft Network
Midland Internet
Stopped service in 1997. Accounts 
transferred to Wave Internet
Millenium Internet 
Services No information
Minidata
Greymouth to 
Hokatika $2.50/hr
Molten Media
NetAccess Christchurch
$50 ($250 
dedicated line)
(a) none (b) $48/mo for 100hrs c) 
$62/mo for 200hrs (d) $150/mo 
dedicated line flat rate
(a) $2/hr peak, $1.50/hr off-
peak (b)&c) $1.13/hr
Internet access, email, web page 
hosting , data services, fax email
Netbyte Internet web site design , e-commerce hosting
NetGain Gone.
NetGate 
Communications 
Ltd.
Auckland $25 $35/mo (acct must be prepaid) Not lis ted Internet access, email, web page design  & hosting
NorthInfoLinE 
(NILE)
NZ Flat Net Stopped operation in 1997
NZNET Internet 
Services Ltd. Auckland
$30 (private or 
comml) $80 
with comml web 
site
(a) $29/mo for 30hrs (b) $49/mo for 
80hrs c) $69/mo for 80hrs+5email 
accts (d) $99/mo for 80hrs+5email 
accts+traffic to web site
$1.50/hr
Help desk, modem 
speed: 56.6kbps
Internet access, email, newsgroups, 
web site design & hosting, ISDN, 
microwave link
Omega Centauri 
Internet
OUTnet Internet Auckland
$50 unassisted, 
$100 for service 
call
(a) email only $10/mo (b) $50/mo Internet access, email, web page hosting
Paradise In ternet None
(a) $10/mo for 20hrs (b) $30/mo for 
100hrs $1/hr
Internet access, email, web page 
hosting
Plain  
Communications
PlaNet NZ 
Auckland
Auckland $56.25
(a) $100/yr email only for 
(5hrs+5Mb)/mo (b) $20/mo or 
$220/yr for (20hrs+20Mb)/mo c) 
$25/mo or $275/yr for 
(30hrs+30Mb)/mo (d) $35/mo or 
$385/yr for (45hrs+45Mb)/mo(e) 
$50/mo or $550/yr flat rate for 
6hrs/day (f) $70/mo for 185 in hrs  or 
Mb, all accts are prepaid
$1/hr and $1/Mb for int'l 
traffic
2nd rate schedule: (a) 
$100/yr email only for 
(5hrs+5Mb)/mo (b) 
$20/mo or $210/yr for 
15hrs/mo c) $25/mo 
or $270/yr for 
25hrs/mo (d) $35/mo 
or $382/yr for 
40hrs/mo (e) $50/mo 
or $550/yr for 80hrs 
all  accts are prepaid 
time:$1.50/hr
Internet access, email, ISDN, web 
site hosting, ADSL trial connection
PlaNet (NZ) Bay 
of Plenty        (part  
of PlaNet NZ)
Now Bay of Plenty Internet Services
PlaNet (NZ) 
Canterbury        
(part of PlaNet 
NZ)
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PlaNet (NZ) 
Hawke's Bay
Hawke's  Bay, 
Napier
$40
(a) none (b) $12/mo or $55/tmo or 
$110/yr for 40hrs+5Mb c) 
$22.50/mo or $115.50/6mo or 
$227.50/yr for 40hrs+15Mb (d) 
$22.50/mo $115.50/6mo or 
$227.50/yr for 80hrs+5Mb (e) 
$30/mo for 60hrs (f) $55/mo for 
120hrs
(a) $1.80/hr (b), c)&(d) 
$1.35/hr+$1.35/Mb (e)&(f) 
$1.80/hrtraffic
Internet access, email
PlaNet (NZ) 
Nelson           
(part of PlaNet 
NZ)
PlaNet NZ 
(mlb.planet) Marlbourgh
Internet access, email, ISDN, 
analogue leased lines, news groups
PlaNet (NZ) 
PlaNet (NZ) 
Wellington        
Wellington, 
Kapiti  Coast No price info on page.
PlaNet Free NZ
North  Shore 
as KiwiLink 
Internet 
Services, 
Marlborough
$40 all accounts
(a) $30/mo 60hrs (b) none c) $12/mo 
for 40hrs+5Mb int 'l traffic (d) 
$22.50/mo for 40hrs+15Mb int 'l 
traffic (e) $22.50/mo for 80hrs+5Mb 
(f) $55/mo for 120hrs (g) none (h) 
$270/yr for 30hrs/mo+10Mb/mo (I) 
email only $100/yr for 6Mb
(a) $1.80/hr (b) 
$1.80/hr+$1.35/Mb c),(d) 
& (e) $1.35/hr +$1.35/Mb 
(f) $1.80/hr (g) 
$1/hr+$2/Mb int'l 
traffic+$2/Mb email (I) 
$1.75/Mb
Internet access, email, ISDN, web 
site hosting
PlaNet Free NZ 
Gaia (part of 
PlaNet Free NZ)
Gone
PC Net Auckland Offers Hong Kong radio  service
Quik Internet
RAM Management Hawke's  Bay $30 $20/mo
Lessor of:  $2.50/hr or Int 'l:  
$2.50/Mb peak $1/Mb off-
peak Nat'l:  $1.80/Mb peak, 
$0.75/Mb off-peak
Internet access, email, chat room, 
news groups, radio links, web 
hosting
Scenicland In ternet 
Ltd. Gone  
SineSurf $56.25
Dialup: (a) $10 email only (b) 
$35/mo 1 email acct. c)$45/mo 
2email accts+100Mbemail limit (d) 
$50/mo 1 email acct. (e) $60/mo 2 
email accts+ 150Mbemail (f) 
$75/mo 5Mb web page Perm 
connect: $200/mo for 
28.8kbps+2email accts, $250/mo for 
28.8kbps+5email accts, $250/mo for 
33.6kbps+2email accts, $300/mo for 
33.6kbps+5email accts, $300/mo for 
56.6kbps+2email accts, $350/mo for 
56.6kbps+5email accts .
SirraNet No price info on page.
Sky Surf Internet Auckland $59 ($69 for (e))
(a) None (b) $10/mo for 10hrs c) 
$25/mo for 30hrs (d) $39/mo for 
80hrs peak (e) $39/mo for 80hrs (a) - 
(d) 33.6kbps
(a) $2/hr (b) $1.50/hr c) 
$1/hr (d) $1/hr peak, off-
peak free
Help desk Internet access, email, web site 
design  & hosting
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Southern Internet 
Services Christchurch
$49.95 ($75 
comml)
(a) $15/mo for 6hrs email only (b) 
$35/hr for 20hrs c) $55/mo for 50hrs 
(d) $15/mo for 15hrs (e) $25/mo for 
30hrs (f) $45/mo for 60hrs (g) 
$60/mo for 90hrs (a)-c) prepaid, 
100Mb traffic limit/mo (d)-(g) peak 
time only charged Comml accts:  
$25/mo for 15hrs, $40/mo for 30hrs, 
$55/mo for 45hrs $70/mo for 60hrs 
$90/mo for 90hrs all  peak connect 
time
(a)-c) $2.50/hr peak, 
$1.95/hr off-peak (d)-(g) 
More than 90hrs peak time 
charged at $1 .07/hr, Int 'l:  
$4 .50/Mb peak, $3/Mb off-
peak Nat'l : $2/Mb peak, 
$1.50/Mb Off-peak 
Comml: More than 90hrs 
peak time charged at $1/hr, 
Int'l: $3/Mb peak, 
$1.50/Mb off-peak Nat'l: 
$1/Mb peak, $0.50/Mb off 
peak
Internet access, email
South Net, South 
Net Queenstown, 
South Net Te Anau
Dunedin, 
Invercargill, 
Queenstown, 
Te Anau
$39.95 (none if 
self-installed)
(a) $10/mo (b) $120/yr for 20Mb/mo 
c) $70/mo for 200Mb
(a) $2/hr (b) $0.50/Mb c) 
$0.35/Mb
modem speed: 
56.6kbps
Internet access, ISDN, Secure web 
sites, microwave radio 
connections, VPN
Synapse Networks no price info Internet access, web site hosting 
Taranaki 
Netsource No information
Taranaki No information
The Internet Group 
Northland Ltd 
(IGRIN)
No information
The Net
No current information/No 
Site
The Packing Shed $45
Standard none, Kiwi $22.50/mo for 
20hrs Premier $45/mo for 
100hrs+web page
Standard $2.25/hr Kiwi & 
Premium $1.50/hr
modem speed: 
56.6kbps Internet access, ISDN
TIPNET No longer valid  address.
TpNet Now Synapse Networks
TpNetLink
University of 
Canterbury
Virtual Comm-
Unity
no information
Waiariki Polytech 
Wairarapa In ternet 
NZ
None OR $50 
for installation 
help and free 
access for month
$85/mo for 200hrs OR Connect 
Charges $2.50/hr OR $2/Mb
Internet access, email, newsgroups, 
web hosting, video conferencing, 
radio  network access
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Wanganui Internet Gone
Wanganui 
Polytechnic Gone polytechnic info only .
Wave Internet 
Services
$35
(a) $10/mo for 4hrs (b) $30/mo for 
30hrs c) $45/mo 60hrs (d) $55 for 
100hrs inc 5 email addresses, web 
site 
$2/hr Internet access, email, leased lines, 
web site hosting
Web InterNet
Auckland, 
Hamilton, 
Rotorua, 
Whangarei
$40 ($200 
dedicated)
On acct, 5 email addresses: (a) 
$22.50/mo for unlimited off-peak, 
(b) $30/mo for 40hrs c) $45/mo for 
70hrs (d) $55/mo for 110hrs 
Prepaid, no help desk: $29.75/mo for 
65hrs accts limited to 65hrs/mo 
Prepaid, no Help desk, dedicated: 
$105/mo (Auckland) $123.75 
otherwise
(a) $1/hr (b) $0.70/hr c) 
$0.50/hr dedicated users: 
$0.50/Mb in excess of 
200Mb peak
Help desk, support 
56.6kbps
Internet access, email
Web World Ltd Auckland None
Prepaid: $9.95/mo for 5hrs, 
$19.95/mo for 10 hrs , $29.95/mo for 
15hrs, $34.95/mo for 20hrs, 
$49.95/mo for 30hrs, $74.95/mo for 
50hrs, $90/yr for 5hrs/mo, $180/yr 
for 10hrs/mo, $252/yr for 15hrs/mo, 
$320/yr for 20hrs/mo, $468/yr for 
30hrs/mo, $750/yr for 50hrs/mo, 
$150 for 100hrs, $350 for 250hrs, 
$650 for 500hrs, $900 for 750hrs, 
$1100 for 1000hrs
Prepaid: $2.50/hr Help desk Internet access, email
Wizkid® Internet 
Limited
Christchurch No price info on page Internet access, email, web page 
hosting & design
